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Article
Intermediary Design Duties
OLIVIER SYLVAIN
Online social networking applications and marketplaces enable users to 
discover ideas, people, places, and products.  The companies behind these services 
purport to be little more than the conduits through which users socialize and 
transact business.  It is on this premise that, pursuant to the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA), courts are reluctant to impose liability on intermediaries for 
their users’ illegal online conduct.  In spite of language in the statute that would 
limit the safe harbor to intermediaries that voluntarily moderate users’ content 
and behavior, courts today refrain from granting immunity only in cases in which 
intermediaries “materially contribute” to illegal online conduct.  This has proven 
to be a very high juridical bar for plaintiffs to clear and a very generous 
protection for defendant providers.  
This doctrine rests on an outdated view of how most online intermediaries do 
business.  Today, the largest online companies do not merely host and relay 
messages, uninterested in what their users say or do.  They use behavioral and 
content data to engineer online experiences in ways that are unrelated to the 
charming interest in making connections. Some of the most successful companies,
moreover, collect, analyze, sort, and repackage user data for publication in 
ancillary and secondary markets.  This is how the CDA immunity doctrine, first 
developed by the courts two decades ago, is ill-suited to the world today.  Online 
intermediaries are now aggressively exploiting user content in ways that the 
doctrine does not fully acknowledge, leaving public law priorities and consumer 
protections underenforced.  Vulnerable people and historically subordinated 
groups have the most to lose under this approach.  
This Article proposes a reform that is adapted to online intermediaries’ 
outsized influence today.  It proposes that courts scrutinize the manner in which 
providers in each case elicit user content and the extent to which they exploit that 
data in secondary or ancillary markets.  Following this more searching approach, 
courts will return the doctrine to its roots in the language and purpose of the 
CDA: to shield intermediaries from liability for third-party online conduct only to
the extent they operate as either true conduits of user content.
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OLIVIER SYLVAIN *
INTRODUCTION
Online social networking applications and marketplaces enable users 
to discover ideas, people, places, and products that they would never find
otherwise.  The companies behind these applications purport to do little 
more than offer the “tools” for obtaining “information about what’s going 
on in the world.”1 Policymakers, courts, and legal scholars generally agree 
with this view.2 They tend to see video sharing applications like YouTube, 
                                                                                                                         
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  I am grateful to the following colleagues 
and friends for support and helpful comments during the drafting of this Article: Jim Brudney, Danielle 
Citron, Nestor Davidson, Mary Ann Franks, Eric Goldman, Rachel Goodman, Abner Greene, Jameel 
Jaffer, Olati Johnson, Joe Landau, Ron Lazebnik, Jae Lee, Ethan Leib, Robin Lenhardt, Frank 
Pasquale, Mark Patterson, Kimani Paul-Emile, David Pozen, Joel Reidenberg, Ian Weinstein, and 
Benjamin Zipursky.  I am indebted to Michael Risch and all participants of the February 2017 
Lastowka Cyberlaw Conference at Villanova School of Law for having the patience to review an early 
draft of Part II.  Participants in the Fordham Law School Center on Race, Law, and Justice Colloquium
series provided important insights that have improved the piece.  Jocelyn Sagherian of the Fordham law 
library provided invaluable research support.  Meredith Cusick and Eric Hornbeck, my research 
assistants, were reliable, industrious, and creative in their support of my work on this project.
1 Christina Passariello, Facebook: Media Company or Technology Platform?, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 
30, 2016, 10:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-media-company-or-technology-platform-
1477880520.  See also Mathew Ingram, Facebook Denies It’s a Media Outlet, But Many Users 
Disagree, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/facebook-study-news/ (reporting 
that Facebook resists being labeled as a media company, though many users use Facebook as a news 
outlet); Sam Schechner, Uber’s ‘Not a Taxi Company’ Defense on Trial in EU, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-not-a-taxi-company-defense-on-trial-in-eu-1480427094 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining Uber’s argument that it is not a “transportation 
company” and is instead “an information society services provider that matches drivers with 
passengers”).
2 See Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that “a company like Gawker 
[Media] cannot be considered the publisher of information simply because the company hosts an online 
forum for third-party users to submit comments.”); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–
32 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that America Online, Inc. is a publisher of information, not a distributor 
such as a “traditional news vendor[] or book seller[],” and is therefore, under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), 
immune to causes of action “that would make service providers liable for information originating with 
a third-party user of the service”).  Scholars have noted that social networking sites, such as Facebook, 
should be considered “publishers” of the content posted by third parties, in order to prevent a chilling 
effect on internet free speech.  See, e.g., Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications 
Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 148 (2008) (explaining 
that 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Communications Decency Act, was passed to prevent a “chilling effect on 
Internet speech” that would result from imposing liability on internet intermediaries for the statements 
of third parties); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, 
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 28–29 (2006) (discussing Free Speech 
implications in holding intermediaries responsible for the statements of third parties and noting that 
“intermediaries have a peculiarly fragile commitment to the speech that they facilitate . . . .  [I]n many 
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social networking applications like Facebook, ride hailing mobile services 
like Uber, and short-term homestay marketplaces like Airbnb as the 
“conduits” through which end users communicate, socialize, and transact 
business.3
One can be forgiven for holding this view.  These applications 
facilitate a variety of useful interactions.  It is in this vein that courts today 
generally conclude that ostensibly passive online intermediaries are 
immune from liability for their users’ online conduct and content.4 Citing 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), courts hold that intermediaries 
may only be liable if they “materially contribute” to the illegal online 
conduct and content of their users.5 Courts reason that online 
entrepreneurship and speech would be chilled if providers bore the costly 
burden of policing their many users’ online conduct.6
This doctrine rests on an outdated view of how most service providers 
do business. Today, most providers do not simply relay messages in the 
charming interest of sharing ideas or making connections, uninterested in 
what users say or do.  The most popular applications today collect, 
                                                                                                                         
situations an intermediary . . . cannot capture the full value of speech, but can easily avoid potential 
liability by simply declining to carry speech that could raise problems.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Power 
Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 991, 
998–99, 1006–07, 1009, 1015–16 (2008) (looking favorably upon the Communications Decency Act’s 
efforts to limit an internet intermediary’s liability for the statements of its users, while also arguing that 
the CDA should limit an intermediary’s ability to remove content and freely restrict the free speech of 
its users); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 293, 294, 300 (2011) (noting that websites such as message boards are simply “internet
intermediaries” and that imposing liability for harmful or offensive speech on them may cause them to 
“block or eliminate too much content, including content that might be both lawful and socially 
desirable”).                                        
3 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  See also Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical Copyright 
Perspective, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 842 (2013) (referring to “[s]earch engines” such as 
Google and Yahoo, “content sharing platforms” such as Youtube, “social networks” such as Facebook, 
and “online vendors” such as Airbnb, Uber, and Amazon as “content conduits and content retrieval 
mechanisms”).          
4 See Huon, 841 F.3d at 741–42 (holding that an internet intermediary is immune from liability 
for defamation if it did not create or actively participate in posting the defamatory content); FTC v. 
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o be ‘responsible’ for the development of 
offensive content, one must be more than a neutral conduit for that content.”); Fair Hous. Council of 
San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1162 (“Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive 
computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties . . . .  This grant of 
immunity applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an information content 
provider . . . . A website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider: If it passively 
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to 
that content.” (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted)).  Congress, when drafting the CDA, 
distinguished “interactive computer service[s],” which are immune from liability for the postings of 
third parties, from “information content providers.”  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (f)(3) (1998) (defining 
“information content providers” as persons or entities that are “responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation and development of information”). 
5 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2014). 
6 Id.
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exhaustively analyze, sort, reconfigure, and repurpose customer 
information for commercial gain.7 They rely on proprietary “black box” 
technologies to recommend products, services, and connections 
specifically targeted to each user.8 They employ techniques that keep users 
yearning for more.9 Sometimes, their designs are so deeply affecting that 
they transform the ways in which people talk about experiences in the 
physical world.10
More than this, the companies behind the largest social media 
applications profit from their extraordinary stores of users’ data.11 While 
these companies arguably rely on aggregate user information to enhance 
the online experience for everyone, they, at the same time, also exploit that 
data in other information markets.  Thus, today, online intermediaries do 
not simply make new connections where none existed before.  They 
commercialize their users’ data.  
Profits, of course, are not unlawful.  They are sometimes a relatively 
reliable measure of a company’s commercial success in the United States.  
                                                                                                                         
7 See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Selling You on Facebook, WALL ST. J. (April 7, 
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303302504577327744009046230 (“A Wall 
Street Journal examination of 100 of the most popular Facebook apps found that some seek the email 
addresses, current location and sexual preference, among other details, not only of app users but also of 
their Facebook friends.  One Yahoo service powered by Facebook requests access to a person's 
religious and political leanings as a condition for using it.”); Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, 
Google Knows When Its Users Go to the Store and Buy Stuff, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/23/google-now-knows-when-you-are-
at-a-cash-register-and-how-much-you-are-spending/?utm_term=.277ad9e87871 (noting that Google 
“analyzes users’ Web browsing, search history, and Geographic locations” through “Youtube, Gmail, 
Google Maps, and the Google Play store” and has recently started analyzing credit card records to 
prove the success of its ad campaigns).
8 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3, 20, 28–31, 34, 36, 66, 78–79  (2015) 
(explaining how the term “black box” may mean a recording device, such as the data monitoring 
system in an airplane, or a system whose actual workings are difficult to discern, and noting that black 
box technologies have been used to determine health status, personality, eligibility for employment, 
and consumer habits); see generally MIKOàAJ JAN PISKORSKI, A SOCIAL STRATEGY: HOW WE PROFIT 
FROM SOCIAL MEDIA  (2014).
9 See TIM WU, ATTENTION MERCHANTS (2017); NIR EYAL, HOOKED (2013).
10 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE SHOULD 
WORRY) 2, 6–7, 61 (2011) (stating that “Google is used as a noun and a verb” and observing that 
Google influences ideologies and how its users interact with the world); Swipe Right (Or Left),
OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/swipe_right_(or_left) (last 
visited July 29, 2017) (defining the terms “swipe right,” meaning attractive, and “swipe left,” meaning 
unattractive, which originated from the online dating app Tinder).  
See also Mark Molloy, Facebook Addiction ‘Activates Same Part of the Brain as Cocaine’,
TELEGRAPH (Feb 17, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/12161461/Facebook-
addiction-activates-same-part-of-the-brain-as-cocaine.html (explaining a scientific study that suggests 
that Facebook use “affect[s] our grey matter in a similar way that cocaine does”).
11 See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2017) (manuscript at 4–5, 26), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929643 (stating that companies like Google, Facebook, and Uber benefit 
from monetizing the data collected from their users, making the user of their services the product, not 
the consumer).
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But profits in this context also are the spoils of a legal regime that 
effectively absolves online intermediaries from minding the harmful third-
party user content that they host and repurpose for commercial gain. They 
are the benefits of a legal protection that almost no other entity in other 
legislative fields enjoys.12
Indeed, under current law, providers benefit from an immunity that 
allows them to repurpose user data in ancillary or secondary markets based 
on the happy but outdated fiction that such companies are only facilitating 
user connections. Many online intermediaries, after all, convey 
agnosticism about the substance of their users’ online conduct.  In doing 
so, they dramatically understate the extent to which they pull the strings 
from behind the scenes.  But it is one thing to purport to administer an 
ostensibly neutral application and another matter to exploit user data to 
engineer how users communicate, socialize, and transact business in other 
markets.  
This is how the CDA immunity doctrine, born over two decades ago, is 
at odds with the world as it is today.  Internet intermediaries are structuring 
online content, conduct, and the entire networked environment in ways that 
the current doctrine does not contemplate.13 The consequences of this 
failing are troubling and require reform.14
Consider two prominent online applications that connect people in the 
housing market: Facebook and Airbnb.  Facebook is most well-known for 
its flagship social network application, through which it collects and 
analyzes information about users’ friend networks, communities of 
interest, and “likes” to personalize each user’s experience and connections.  
This is the service for which most users sign up.  But the company does so 
much more with user data.  First, it sells it to advertising networks and data 
                                                                                                                         
12 But see David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures Of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 606 (2013) (discussing the 
“source/distributor divide” in the context of government leaks).
13 Cf. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Elizabeth Kolbert, Who Owns the Internet?, NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/who-owns-the-internet.
14 The most well-known reform proposal would remove the immunity for publishing content that 
enables sex trafficking.  See, e.g., Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. 
(2017).  Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes argue persuasively for reform in a law review article 
published shortly before this one.  See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not 
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORD. L. REV. 401 (2017).  Google has 
underscored the powerful gatekeeping role in our networked information economy if news reports that 
it is “manipulating its search engine results to favor opposition to” the legislation are to be believed.  
See PR Newswire, Google Appears to Be Manipulating Its Search Engine Results to Defend Internet 
Law that Enables Sex Trafficking, Consumer Watchdog Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2017), 
http://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/Google-Appears-to-Be-Manipulating-Its-Search-
Engine-Results-to-Defend-Internet-Law-that-Enables-Sex-Trafficking-Consumer-Watchdog-Finds-
1002359550.
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brokers.  Second, and more pertinently, it relies on the information it learns 
about users to offer advertisers the powerful ability to market products and 
services to potential “microtargeted” buyers.15 Until very recently, the 
company allowed advertisers to target users based on their “ethnic 
affinities” through this distinct but ancillary service.16 Thus, a hypothetical 
building manager or broker could advertise an apartment for rent and 
distribute the ad to people whose “ethnic affinities” fit a profile that he or 
she prefers.  With this designation, the service enables our manager or 
broker to exclude people on that basis as well.  
Facebook’s advertisement service is not limited by industry.  An 
advertiser can reach audiences across product types, from cosmetics to 
sports clothing to kitchen appliances.  Airbnb’s service, on the other hand,
enables members to advertise short-term rentals or apply to stay at those 
listings.  It urges members to share personal information, including their 
names and personal profile pictures, which it, in turn, reserves the right to 
sell to travel management partners and other third parties.17 The company 
personalizes accounts to engender an authentic connection between hosts 
and guests in ways that conventional online classified sites like Craigslist 
do not.  This ambition for fostering trusted and authentic connections 
comes at a cost—when hosts look to accept someone they trust into their 
homes, they look for familiar signs, including the potential guest’s race.  
According to a Harvard Business School study, hosts systematically 
discriminate against racial minorities based on the latter’s pictures and 
names.18 As difficult as it is to detect when hosts are racist in their guest 
                                                                                                                         
15 See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Shooting Your Brand in the Foot: What Citizens United 
Invites, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1297, 1324–25 (2016) (“[I]nformation filter[s] place[] consumers in 
isolated ‘tribes’. . . .  [T]o the extent customers are living in their own tribal worlds, marketers will try 
to reach the customer in their respective bubbles.  This means mass marketers increasingly need to 
micro-target sub-demographic groups.” (footnotes omitted)).  Facebook also sells data to be used in 
political campaigns.  Allison Brennan, Microtargeting: How Campaigns Know You Better Than You 
Know Yourself, CNN (Nov. 5, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/politics/voters-
microtargeting/index.html (explaining how Facebook sells information to political campaigns so that 
the campaigns may microtarget certain favorable demographics with political ads). 
16 Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-
exclude-users-by-race; Annalee Newitz, Facebook’s Ad Platform Now Guesses at Your Race Based on 
Your Behavior, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 18, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2016/03/facebooks-ad-platform-now-guesses-at-your-race-based-on-your-behavior/.
17 Privacy Policy, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms/privacy_policy (last visited July 31, 
2017).
18 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 2 (2017) (“We find 
widespread discrimination against guests with distinctively African American names. African 
American guests received a positive response roughly 42 percent of the time, compared to roughly 50 
percent for white guests.”). 
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selection, anecdotal reports of Airbnb-facilitated discrimination surface 
with enough frequency to suggest that the practice is not rare.19
There are good reasons to be concerned about these aspects of the 
Facebook advertising service and Airbnb.  Consider in particular the way
in which both services enable advertisers to target their ads based on 
information that is barred by anti-discrimination laws.  The 1968 Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) specifically forbids home sellers or renters, as well as 
brokers, property managers, and agents, from distributing advertisements 
“that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin . . . .”20
Both companies have defensible arguments that they may not be held 
liable for the discriminatory online behavior of their users under the 
prevailing immunity doctrine.  Under this theory, they simply provide the 
tools on which users, landlords, and building managers rely as they please.  
In the language of the current doctrine, neither Facebook nor Airbnb are 
materially contributing to the objectionable content.
Yet, these companies know that they may be doing something wrong, 
if not illegal.  Both companies have taken steps to diminish the racially 
discriminatory impact of their respective applications in recognition of the 
role that their applications may play.  Airbnb commissioned a prominent 
civil rights attorney to study hosts’ use of the application.21 This report 
was not an empirical study of Airbnb host racism as such.  But its findings 
acknowledged patterns of discrimination and recommended remedial steps, 
all of which the company adopted.22 Airbnb also announced that it would 
redouble its commitment to nondiscrimination.23 While it has not 
discontinued the use of photographs, the main concern of civil rights 
groups, it now has a strict policy of removing members who use the 
application in ways that violate civil rights laws.24
Facebook, for its part, reformed its audience selection policy in the 
advertising service, replacing the “ethnic affinity” classifications with what 
                                                                                                                         
19 See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, Does Airbnb Enable Racism?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/opinion/how-airbnb-can-fight-racial-discrimination.html 
(describing the African American author’s unusual difficulty in booking an Airbnb reservation); Carla 
Javier, A Trump-Loving Airbnb Host Canceled This Woman’s Reservation Because She’s Asian,
SPLINTER NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017, 4:11 PM), http://splinternews.com/a-trump-loving-airbnb-host-
canceled-this-womans-reserva-1794086239 (reporting that an Asian woman’s Airbnb reservation was 
cancelled abruptly and displaying screenshots of text messages where the host said: “I wouldn’t rent to 
u [sic] if u [sic] were the last person on earth.  One word says it all.  Asian.”).
20 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2007).  
21 LAURA MURPHY, LAURA MURPHY & ASSOCS., AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION 
AND BUILD INCLUSION: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO AIRBNB 10 (2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf. 
22 Id. at 10–12. 
23 Id. at 12.  
24 Id. at 10–11. 
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it now calls “multicultural affinity.”25 The company also now prohibits 
users from targeting or excluding specific groups of people from seeing 
ads for housing, credit, or employment.26 It requires advertisers to certify 
that their practices comply with its nondiscrimination policies and 
antidiscrimination laws.27
These are important steps.  But, one year later, Facebook reportedly 
continues to enable advertisers to discriminate against protected classes.28
In any event, Facebook’s (ostensibly failing) efforts to reform are not 
enough to stop discrimination in other online markets for housing.  What 
of all other applications and marketplaces that purport to be content
agnostic about online conduct, but whose designs enable users to do bad 
things they might not otherwise be able to do?  Under the current doctrine, 
liability may not reach intermediaries that routinely host illegal content by 
design.  And, in any event, bigoted advertisers will continue to use 
Facebook’s service notwithstanding the proviso from Facebook that such 
uses are not permitted.  Other services, moreover, may choose not to 
respond in the same way that Facebook has.
The immunity under the CDA, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230, gives such 
intermediaries cover largely because courts have read the protection 
broadly.  And they have had good reason to.  The first operative provision 
of the statute states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”29 Congress’s reference 
here to “publisher or speaker” draws from defamation law doctrine, where 
a defendant publisher is as liable for republishing reputation-damaging 
                                                                                                                         
25 Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Feb. 8, 2017), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/02/improving-
enforcement-and-promoting-diversity-updates-to-ads-policies-and-tools/.  See also Sapna 
Maheshwari & Mike Isaac, Facebook Will Stop Some Ads From Targeting Users by Race, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/business/media/facebook-will-stop-some-ads-
from-targeting-users-by-race.html?_r=0 (“Facebook responded on Friday to concern that it was 
violating anti-discrimination laws, announcing that marketers placing housing, employment or credit 
ads on the social network would no longer be able to use tools that target people by ethnicity.”).
26 See Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools,
supra note 25 (“[A]dvertisers may not discriminate against people based on personal attributes such as 
race, ethnicity, color, national origin . . . .  When an advertiser attempts to show an ad that we identify 
as offering a housing, employment or credit opportunity and either includes or excludes our 
multicultural advertising segments—which consist of people interested in seeing content related to the 
African American, Asian American and US Hispanic communities—we will disapprove the ad.”).
27 See id. (“When an advertiser attempts to show an ad that we identify as offering a housing, 
employment or credit opportunity and uses any other audience segment on Facebook . . . . [w]e will . . . 
require the advertiser to certify that it is complying with that policy and with applicable anti-
discrimination laws.”). 
28 See Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin, and Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing 
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-
origin?utm_campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=1511288776.
29 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  
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material as its author.30 When enacted in 1996, Section 230(c) was 
intended to bar courts from holding providers liable for publishing
information that could harm users’ reputation.  
This was and remains an idiosyncratic and exceptional treatment under 
law.  Newspapers and book imprints, for example, remain as liable for 
publishing unlawful classified advertisements or opinion editorials as the 
original authors are.31 Legislators in 1996 expressed the view that 
providers of online services and applications were different—that they 
should not be held to account for the massive amounts of third-party user 
content that they host and publish.32 Parroting the emergent ethos among 
technologists and internet free-speech activists, legislators in this period 
found that imposing liability on online intermediaries for failing to screen 
or remove all offending content would exact a “chilling” toll on all users 
that is far greater than it would be for traditional publishers.33 In such a 
world, providers would censor any content that they rightly or wrongly 
believe exposes them to liability.34 Section 230 relieves intermediaries of 
that heavy burden in the interest of promoting entrepreneurship and 
freedom of expression online.  
Most legislators in 1996, however, could not have anticipated that the 
internet would permeate public life or that intermediaries would engineer 
practically all our online conduct.  They did appreciate, however, that the 
protection could not be absolute.  Section 230 specifically provides that the 
immunity recedes when the provider in question “is responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the creation or development” of the offending information.35
                                                                                                                         
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“Except as to those who 
only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).  
31 See id. at cmt. b (“It is no defense that the second publisher names the author or original 
publisher of the libel.  Thus a newspaper is subject to liability if it republishes a defamatory statement . 
. . .”).
32 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 8471 (1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“There is no way that
any of those entities . . . can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in 
to them from all manner of sources . . . .  We are talking about something that is going to be thousands 
of pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is wrong.”).
33 See id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (“If we regulate the Internet at the FCC, that will freeze or at 
least slow down technology.  It will threaten the future of the Internet.”); id. (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren) (“Really it is like saying that the mailman is going to be liable when he delivers a plain brown 
envelope for what is inside it.  It will not work.  It is a misunderstanding of the technology . . . .  I 
would urge [47 U.S.C. § 230’s] approval so that we preserve the first amendment and open systems on 
the Net.”). 
34 See Wu, supra note 2, at 300 (noting that internet intermediaries, if exposed to liability, may 
delete a substantial amount of content, even content that is “lawful and socially desirable”).
35 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1998). 
2018] INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES 213
Congress also wrote in a “Good Samaritan” safe harbor to incentivize 
providers to mind their users’ “objectionable” content.36
The courts have nevertheless adopted a very broad reading of the 
statute that belies these limits on immunity.  The courts reason that, 
without this generous protection, the threat of litigation would chill 
providers’ willingness to host and publish all but the most anodyne 
content.37 So, even while a meaningful but small threat of litigation always 
remains, service providers today rest easy in knowing that they are not 
legally implicated by any of their users’ harmful communications.  
Today, the Good Samaritan, who is supposed to tend to the most 
vulnerable,38 plays no role in the courts’ administration of Section 230.  In 
a glaring irony, the prevailing doctrine turns the biblical parable for which 
Congress named the operative provisions on its head.  
To be fair, some of the objectives to which legislators aspired have 
come to pass.  Users today have an abundance of ways to transact business 
and socialize online largely because entrepreneurs have felt safe to 
experiment and innovate, unconcerned by the potential for third-party 
wrongdoing.  Yet, there is good reason to doubt that entrepreneurs needed 
the immunity to enter the market.  Even in the mid-1990s, people 
understood that the internet’s transmission protocols, interoperable 
network design, and end-user focus would transform markets and birth 
lucrative new ones.  The internet was always promising, with or without 
the protection of Section 230.  But the prevailing online immunity doctrine 
has removed much of the risk for entrepreneurs.  This is largely why, 
today, applications and websites of all kinds, from the frivolous to the truly 
disruptive, seem to spring up nearly daily.
The current doctrine gives the online entrepreneurs behind these 
services no incentive to be Good Samaritans—or to even consider the 
social costs of their services.  In this way, the courts have developed a 
broad immunity that could very well protect Facebook and Airbnb from 
liability for systematic third-party violations of the FHA.  The doctrine, 
after all, is premised largely on the view that service providers should not 
have to police the massive amount of third-party content that flows through 
their servers.  Bigoted advertisers in this conception are to blame, not the 
                                                                                                                         
36 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable 
on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”)
37 See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Faced with potential 
liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might 
choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.”)
38 See Luke 10:25–37 (“[A] Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he saw 
him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine.  Then he 
put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him.”).
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engineers of the “neutral” tools that facilitate connections.  It is for this 
reason that neither Facebook nor Airbnb might be required to police the 
illegally discriminatory expressive acts of the millions of users of its 
services.  Facebook does not discriminate in the housing market; its users 
and advertisers do.  Airbnb does not require users to signify racial 
preferences; hosts do.    
This Article proposes a reform that is adapted to the influence that 
developers of applications and marketplaces like Facebook and Airbnb 
have today.  But I do not invent this recommendation out of whole cloth.  
While Section 230 doctrine to this point suggests that those specific 
companies would be immune for users’ unlawful online conduct, 
developments of the past few years suggest that providers like Facebook 
and Airbnb should be wary.  Courts have begun to pull away from their 
broad reading of Section 230 and attend more carefully to the ways in 
which online intermediaries design users’ online content and transactions.  
While courts have instituted the high bar of “material contribution” to 
evaluate whether a provider had a hand in developing illegal content, they 
also have identified designs and conditions that define the substance of the 
information that users share.39
Based on these developments, I propose here that courts shield 
providers from liability for third-party online conduct only to the extent 
they either are true passive conduits or actually take good-faith steps to 
remove or block illegal content.  In some regards, this is a reframing of the 
Good Samaritan safe harbor that Congress already articulated in the 
statute.  But, importantly, it pivots away from conditioning immunity only 
on “restrict[ing] access” to “objectionable” content.40 The proposal here 
instead would bar immunity when providers process and publish user data 
in ancillary or secondary markets in ways such that their users do not 
knowingly or directly benefit. In practice, this approach would likely 
continue to shield intermediaries that do nothing more than provide the 
adverted networking and marketplace service, but would likely not shield 
those like Facebook or Airbnb that sell user data to advertisers to varying 
extents.
                                                                                                                         
39 See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
“develop[ment],” in the context of the CDA, means to “draw[] something out, making it visible, active, 
or usable,” and that intermediaries are “responsible” for the development of offensive content if they 
“specifically encourage[] development of what is offensive about the content” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties 
to express illegal preferences” and holding that Roommate.com, an internet intermediary, developed 
offensive content by directing its users to sort potential housing mates by personal characteristics such 
as race, gender, and sexuality). 
40 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (1998). 
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While I claim novelty here, I do so mindful of the massive number of 
law review pages devoted to the topic of online intermediary immunity.  
To the extent this Article offers anything new, it is in its argument that
online intermediary designs implicate online services and applications far 
more than courts have recognized to this point.41 In this regard, it adds 
another dimension to the argument that Congress ought to narrow the 
scope of protection under the statute for publication of harmful material 
like nonconsensual porn.42 This Article also identifies the ways in which 
content agnosticism has the effect of harming historically subordinated 
groups in historically fraught legal markets like housing, employment, and 
credit.  Communications law in the United States encourages inclusion as a 
matter of course.43 The safe harbor under Section 230, I argue, should 
similarly be read to apply to firms that take affirmative steps in good faith 
to protect against unlawful—that is, systematically discriminatory—online 
behavior.    
This Article makes its argument in four parts.  Part I describes the 
current ways in which intermediaries collect and generally interact with 
information from users.  The range of prominent design features, from 
anonymity to ephemeral messaging, suggests that providers have far more 
agency in choosing how to structure their services and applications.  They 
are generally motivated, moreover, by commercial incentives that often 
counsel for structuring applications and services that are far more 
determinative of user content than the prevailing doctrine presumes.  
Part II describes the evolution of the current doctrine, from the 
high-minded and broad protection of intermediaries in the late 1990s to its 
current refinements and elaborations.  In this evolution, I show that service 
and application designs have come into sharper focus for courts.  Part III
builds on this account to demonstrate the ways in which the current 
doctrine has created an opening for considering the ways in which 
intermediary designs determine user content and online conduct.  
Finally, in Part IV, the Article returns to the example of Facebook’s 
                                                                                                                         
41 There are important overlaps, moreover, with the contemporaneously published piece by 
Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes on the limitations of current doctrine and the need for reform 
addressed to gender-based abuse and sex trafficking.  See Citron & Wittes, supra note 14.
42 See Stop Enabling Sex-Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017); Danielle Keats 
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 
Immunity, 86 FORD. L. REV. 401 (2017).
43 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996) (stating that the Federal Communications Commission was created 
“[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio 
so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service”); Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
443, 449 (2016) (“The FCC has declared that the Internet is a public general use technology—like 
electricity—and, accordingly, must be treated under law as a common carrier.  Under this rule, service 
providers must ensure that all members of the public who try to access the Internet are treated 
equally.”). 
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advertising service to argue that, indeed, there are compelling reasons for 
reading Section 230 far more carefully in today’s online environment.
I. ANTISOCIAL MEDIA
Policymakers, technologists, and activists have had great hopes for the 
internet.  The excitement about its promise was no more feverish than in 
the first decade or so after Congress fully commercialized it in 1995.  The 
general view then was that the internet’s transmission protocols, distributed 
and interoperable network design, and end-user focus would cause deep 
structural transformations everywhere and in all aspects of life.44
Nongovernmental consensus-driven administration and standards would 
govern.45
It is this ethos that gave rise to 47 U.S.C. § 230—one of the most 
important legislative enactments addressed to internet services and 
applications.46 Among other things, Section 230 (entitled the 
Communications Decency Act) shields providers of “interactive computer 
service[s]” from liability for content that their third-party users circulate 
through the online service.47 As written, this protection, however, does not 
reach applications that are in any part “responsible . . . for the creation or 
development” of “objectionable” material.48 But there is more to the 
statute than a simple reform of defamation law.  Through it, Congress 
explicitly shields service providers from liability for exercising “Good 
Samaritan” editorial judgment about substantive content.  That is, the 
immunity applies to services that edit, filter, or take down objectionable 
material, or help users to do so.49
Courts read Section 230 extremely broadly in spite of how it is written.  
They hold that the provision immunizes networked services and online 
                                                                                                                         
44 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law And Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence; 
Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace And The American Dream: A Magna Carta For The Knowledge Age,
FUTURE INSIGHT (Aug. 1994), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html.
45 Johnson & Post, supra note 44, at 1367; Barlow, supra note 44; Dyson et al., supra note 44.
46 The Communications Decency Act is Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998)).  
47 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).  The statute explicitly preempts state tort law.  Section 230(e)(3) 
provides, among other things, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).
48 Id. §§ 230(c)(2)(A), (f)(3).
49 Id. Section 230(c)(2) shields interactive computer services that have voluntarily taken steps in 
good faith to censor or take down “material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected . . . .”  Id. I return to the particulars of the statute—its text, 
history, and purposes—infra Part II.
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applications from liability for publishing the illegal content of their users.50
So, under current law, a social media company cannot be held responsible 
for allowing a user to post compromising private photographs of his ex-
girlfriend publicly.51 A search engine cannot be called to task under law 
for displaying the advertisements of third parties that sell copyrighted 
ringtones.52 An online advertising service is under no legal obligation to 
remove posts that encourage the sex trafficking of minors.53
Two decades later, there is reason to believe that Section 230 and the 
information libertarianism on which it is based have been a great success.54
The internet’s remarkably rapid integration into public life over the past 
two decades has arguably shown that application developers, free from the 
threat of government regulation or tort liability, can be good stewards of 
life and commerce online.  Popular applications like YouTube, the 
video-sharing site, and Reddit, the news aggregation and discussion site, 
have developed conventions and software for the moderation of user 
content, even as users create, contribute, and interact prodigiously.55 These 
services are the conduits envisioned by the early proponents of broad 
                                                                                                                         
50 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
51 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1098, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by Barnes 
v. Yahoo, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21308 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Yahoo! was not responsible 
for one of its users posting an ex-girlfriend’s nude photographs on his profile).
52 See Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195, 1197–98, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(holding that Google was not responsible for fraudulent advertisements that were posted on Google’s 
websites).
53 Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16, 18–22 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
622 (2017). 
54 See generally Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL.
L. REV. 335 (2017).
55 YouTube removes or age restricts “nudity or sexual content,” “harmful or dangerous content,” 
copyrighted content, “hateful content” which “promotes or condones violence against individuals or 
groups,” “threats,” and “spam, misleading metadata, and scams.”  Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); 
Nudity and Sexual Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802002 (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2017).  YouTube removes inappropriate content through a “flagging” system, where 
YouTube users “flag” videos or comments and a member of YouTube staff reviews the video or 
comment and removes it if it violates the community guidelines.  Id. YouTube also uses a system 
called “Content ID,” which compares user uploads to copyrighted content and automatically blocks, 
monetizes, or tracks the content if it finds a match.  How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).  Reddit relies 
heavily on volunteer moderators, who are capable of removing content, banning users from their 
“subreddits,” and creating “AutoModerator,” which are “bot” that remove certain kinds of content 
automatically.  Moderation, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/wiki/moderation (last visited Aug. 5, 
2017).  Reddit, which emphatically champions free speech, was criticized in 2015 for permanently 
banning five “questionable” subreddits.  See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, These Are the Five Subreddits Reddit 
Banned Under Its Game-Changing Anti-Harassment Policy—And Why it Banned Them, WASH. POST
(June 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/06/10/these-are-the-5-
subreddits-reddit-banned-under-its-game-changing-anti-harassment-policy-and-why-it-banned-
them/?utm_term=.92bf470cd3b4 (discussing Reddit’s actions in banning subreddits “dedicated to fat-
shaming,” “transphobia,” “ racism,” and “to harassing members of a progressive video game site”). 
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immunity for providers, helping to transform the internet into the “forum 
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”56 And they 
have done so with a “minimum of government regulation.”57
But, today, online intermediaries are more than open forums for 
user-generated discourse, cultural development, and intellectual activity.  
Those priorities have given way to or, rather, have been complicated by 
pecuniary ones.  In the mid-2000s, prominent observers of the 
networked-information economy debated whether for-profit motivations 
would predominate online.58 There is little question, however, that most 
application developers today have either succumbed to the commercial 
prerogatives of the large corporations that have bought them or, having 
become large companies themselves, have leveraged their market position 
to develop ancillary or secondary lines of business. 
Today, online services do so much more than relay or store 
user-generated content in the way that the early proponents of immunity 
and nongovernmental interference presumed.  They actively shape every 
aspect of the user experience.59 Many of the most successful internet 
companies, moreover, design their applications to collect, analyze, sort,
reconfigure, and repurpose user data for their own commercial reasons, 
unrelated to the original interest in publishing material or connecting 
users.60 These developments belie any suggestion that online 
intermediaries are merely conduits of user information anymore.  Today, to 
the extent a company purports to be agnostic about its users’ content, it 
generally does so mindful that its design will invite a wide range of 
content, including illegal or otherwise antisocial material.  
Content moderation like that employed by YouTube or Reddit, 
therefore, is only a piece of how intermediaries manage user content.  And 
this is an important point, as it suggests that the original logic for immunity 
is incomplete or simply wrong.  Indeed, providers today are far more 
implicated in the kinds of content that users create or commercial 
transactions into which users enter.  So, in order for the immunity doctrine 
to be addressed to our current state of affairs, the courts will have to revise 
                                                                                                                         
56 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
57 Id. § 230(a)(4).
58 See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, The Carr-Benkler Wager and the Peer-Powered Economy, GIGAOM
(May 9, 2012, 3:02 PM), https://gigaom.com/2012/05/09/the-carr-benkler-wager-and-the-peer-
powered-economy/ (discussing a 2006 bet between author Nick Carr and Harvard professor Yochai 
Benkler, where Benkler wagered that the internet is primarily based on “commons-based peer 
production” and Carr wagered that content sharing networks were only successful because a market 
had not yet developed for online goods). 
59 Cf. Klonick, supra note 13; Kolbert, supra note 13.
60 See supra notes 7, 8, 15 and accompanying text.  This is to say nothing of the myriad of ways 
in which companies use algorithmic processing and machine learning to predict user online behavior.
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their current approach.  As I recommend later, the doctrine would have to 
require courts to consider whether intermediaries’ designs create the
conditions under which their users unavoidably engage in illegal activity.
Before turning to reform, however, this Part describes our current state 
of affairs.  First, I outline the ways in which applications that rely on 
user-generated content manage their users’ interactions, even while they 
purport to be mere passive hosts.  To do this, I review the way in which 
some of the most recognizable online intermediaries today have chosen to 
moderate user content and interactions.  And while moderation has 
emerged as an important way of managing user interactions, I then show 
that popular intermediaries today, namely, Airbnb and Facebook, are 
constantly managing the design of their applications in order to structure 
the manner in which user content gets shared and manipulated by others.  
The lesson in all of this is that, today, as application designs become ever 
more determinative of online conduct, we might expect that the scope of 
immunity would recede.  
A. Moderating User Content 
Through Section 230, Congress sought to encourage online 
intermediaries to be passive conduits that facilitate end users’ 
communications and transactions.  Providers in this conception contribute 
nothing original or material to their users’ content.  They only undertake a 
limited set of operations to support user creativity and user-to-user 
interaction, agnostic about the substance of the thing.  Under the current 
doctrine, this relative unconcern with content qualifies a provider for 
immunity.  Congress sought to protect these kinds of services and 
applications in order to encourage content diversity and the free flow of 
information on the internet.61 Courts, in interpreting Section 230, 
presumed that, without the protection, providers would be chilled into 
censoring unpopular or unsavory online user conduct far more than 
necessary to avoid even the possibility of liability.62
Today, several popular web-based applications continue to embody 
this laissez-faire conception, operating as simple “platforms” for the 
distribution of user-generated content.63 YouTube, the video-sharing 
                                                                                                                         
61 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012) (“The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”). 
62 See Wu, supra note 2, at 300, 315–18 (stating that Congress’s intent in passing Section 230 was 
vague, but that courts interpreted the statute to mean that internet intermediaries should not be subject 
to liability, as it would have a “chilling effect” on freedom speech on the internet). 
63 The platform metaphor itself is very evocative and, as such, often used by scholars in 
information and communications law.  See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 87, 94 (2016) (stating that “a platform company is launched as an online intermediary between 
buyers and sellers of goods and services—the ancient role of the middle man”); Richard S. Whitt, 
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application, is probably the most recognizable of these.  On the one hand, it 
has become invaluable to the promotion and distribution of videos by 
professionals and major production studios.  But, as the company’s name 
and slogan “Broadcast Yourself” suggest, YouTube markets itself above 
all as a democratic forum through which any and all users may express 
themselves.64 Its administrators only manage registration, suspension, or 
deletion of user accounts, the means by which users upload videos, and 
features through which other users may rank or comment on the post.65
While the company enters into distribution and syndication arrangements 
with content developers, at the core of the YouTube business, as with most 
applications that rely on user-generated content, is a faith in the creativity 
and agency of users as creators and discriminating consumers.  
This is to say nothing of the way in which the service has helped to 
disintermediate hub-and-spoke video distribution models in, for example, 
broadcasting and cable television.  By creating a platform for individual 
users to post videos, YouTube has helped to foster a whole new logic and 
political economy for content distribution.  In this way, it is the 
quintessential exemplar of what Congress and scholars must have had in 
mind twenty years ago.  
But questions remain about the extent to which YouTube or other 
user-generated video sharing applications must actively monitor and, in 
some ways, shape content on their sites.66 The company has been the 
defendant in secondary liability claims in a variety of cases, including a 
widely publicized billion-dollar lawsuit for hosting high-value copyrighted 
material posted by third-party users without authorization.67 It is clear 
                                                                                                                         
Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 439 (2009) (using platform as a “helpful metaphor” to argue that the 
purpose of broadband is “to serve as a platform for allowing end users to utilize the capabilities of the 
Internet”).  The metaphor, however, has its limitations, as it assumes too much.  Frank Pasquale offers 
a more nuanced and productive point of view.  See generally Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of 
Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2016).
64 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Under the 
slogan ‘Broadcast yourself,’ Youtube achieved rapid prominence and profitability . . . .”).
65 See, e.g., id. (stating that YouTube requires users to register for an account and requires users to 
agree to its terms of service, but does not create, strictly moderate, or review all content uploaded to the 
site). 
66 For example, if the intermediaries have “actual knowledge” of hosting copyrighted material, 
they may be open to liability if they do not take sufficient steps to remove the illegal content.  UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2013). See Viacom 
Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 33–34 (discussing email conversations wherein the YouTube founders, Jared 
Karim and Chad Hurley, debated the costs and benefits of removing specific copyrighted materials 
from the site, which exposed YouTube to liability for hosting the illegal content). 
67 See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 28–29 (summarizing a class action suit brought against 
YouTube, where a group of several copyright holders brought suit against YouTube for knowingly 
hosting 63,497 videos containing copyrighted material).  Viacom originally sued YouTube for $1 
billion; the case was settled and the terms of the settlement were not disclosed.  See Jonathan Stempel, 
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from these cases that YouTube and other video sharing sites like it can and 
indeed do moderate which user-generated content appears on the service, 
even if it does not create or edit the content once up. Indeed, YouTube in 
particular administers a “Partner Program” through which users can 
syndicate video programming through the service,68 as well as Content ID, 
which empowers copyright holders to track unauthorized posts by users of 
their content.69
Yet, irrespective of the extent to which YouTube monitors or engages 
users’ content, the service remains mostly a disinterested repository for 
uninhibited user expression, hosting an astounding number of videos 
addressed to almost all humanly-known topics. In this way, YouTube 
resembles a conduit through which all user content may reach every user of 
the application. But, again, it is not a purely passive conduit, as it 
structures the ways in which users post and monitor content.
As with most providers like it, YouTube recognized the perils of 
designing its service in this way early on.  It, again, like most 
user-generated content platforms, requires its users to abide by
“Community Guidelines.” Failure to adhere will lead to account 
suspension or termination.70
Even Reddit, an online website that has been evangelical about its 
non-interventionist approach to user-generated content since its founding 
in 2005, has reformed its approach over the last couple of years.  Like 
YouTube, Reddit allows registered users to comment on and vote up or 
down stories and posts from any source.71 The community of users assigns 
each story to a predetermined category—say, in movies, gaming, and 
“futurology.”72 But Reddit allows registered users to initiate discussion 
                                                                                                                         
Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:05 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318.  In 2015, an 
actress brought a suit against YouTube for hosting an edited, controversial video of herself, for which 
she received death threats.  Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 736–38 (9th Cir. 2015).  The actress 
alleged that she owned the copyright for her own image, but her claim ultimately failed on that ground.  
Id. at 740–41, 744, 747.
68 YouTube Partner Program Overview, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube
/answer/72851?hl=en (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
69 How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
70 Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/en-
GB/communityguidelines.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (“Accounts are penalised [sic] for 
Community Guidelines violations, and serious or repeated violations can lead to account termination.”). 
71 See, e.g., Andrew Couts, How to Get a Link on the Front Page of Reddit, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Apr. 12, 2013, 12:02 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/how-to/how-to-get-a-link-on-the-front-page-
of-reddit/ (“Once a link is submitted, other users can either “upvote” or “downvote” the link.  They can 
also comment on the link.”).
72 Futurology, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Futurology/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Gaming,
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Movies, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/movies/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
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threads called “subreddits.”73 The popularity of any post determines its 
location on the site, with the most popular being the most visible on the 
first entry page.74 This bottom-up, democratic design has made Reddit a 
celebrated site among online speech enthusiasts.
Reddit, however, also has fallen victim to its own design as it finds 
itself hosting provocative posts and subreddits, including those that 
promote terrorist or misogynist violence.75 In response to substantial 
pushback from users over the past couple of years, the company has 
revised its extremely laissez-faire position.  In early 2017, for example, it 
adopted a “Content Policy” that, on the one hand, promotes the site as the 
“home to some of the most authentic content anywhere online,” but, 
importantly, also recognizes the value of “show[ing] enough respect to 
others so that we all may continue to enjoy Reddit for what it is.”76
Among other things, the policy explicitly prohibits “illegal” content, 
“involuntary pornography,” material that “[e]ncourages or incites 
violence,” and content that “[t]hreatens, harasses, or bullies or encourages 
others to do so.”77
This reform has been met with palpable resistance from some very 
vocal users.  In response to efforts by the company to ban misogynist 
threads under this new policy,78 for example, “redditors” and online 
                                                                                                                         
73 See What Are Communities or “Subreddits”?, REDDITHELP, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204533569-What-are-communities-or-subreddits (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (defining 
“subreddits” as “sub-communities within reddit . . . created and moderated by users . . . dedicated each 
to certain topics or ideas”).
74 See, e.g., Couts, supra note 71 (“Once a link is submitted, other users can either ‘upvote’ or 
‘downvote’ the link . . . .  Submitted posts rise or fall based on the number of upvotes, which add to the 
overall ‘karma’ score of the post, versus the number of downvotes, which are subtracted from the 
overall score. . . .  The posts with the greatest number of upvotes in a each subreddit can rise to the 
coveted front page.”).
75 See Rob Crilly, Reddit Takes Down Forum Used To Share Stolen Celebrity Photographs,
TELEGRAPH (Sep. 8, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/ 
11080844/Reddit-takes-down-forum-used-to-share-stolen-celebrity-photographs.html (“The news and 
social networking site Reddit has removed a platform that last week allowed users to share a cache of 
stolen celebrity images, many of them explicit.  They included naked pictures of Jennifer Lawrence, the 
Oscar-winning actress, and allegedly more than 100 other A-listers obtained by a hacker . . . .”); 
Charlie Warzel, Reddit Is a Shrine to the Internet We Wanted and That’s a Problem, BUZZFEED (June 
19, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/reddit-is-a-shrine-to-the-internet-we-
wanted-and-thats-a-pro?utm_term=.bwnAJV57v#.wm472kR31 (discussing Reddit’s ban of five 
offensive subreddits, including /r/transfags and /r/fatpeoplehate, and noting how many users objected to 
new restrictions on free speech).
76 Reddit Content Policy, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/help/contentpolicy/ (last visited Aug. 
5, 2017). 
77 Id. See also Removing Harassing Subreddits, REDDIT (June 10, 2015), https://np.reddit.com/ 
r/announcements/comments/39bpam/removing_harassing_subreddits/ (announcing Reddit’s intention 
to remove subreddits that are used as tools to harass people). 
78 See Reddit Content Policy, supra note 76 (restricting content commonly associated with 
misogyny, such as “involuntary pornography”).
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free-speech enthusiasts voted up comments that addressed Reddit’s 
Asian-American female CEO in racist and misogynist ways.79 These users
were successful enough to push the hateful comments to the site’s front 
page.80 Since this episode, the company has hired more personnel to 
manage or moderate subreddits and comments.  Reddit today is walking a 
fine line between promoting user content and touting itself as the “first 
page of the Internet.”81
B. Designing User Content 
The difficulty of administering an open platform that all people feel 
free to join in spite of the “openness” is not unique to popular 
intermediaries like YouTube and Reddit.  All major online services and 
applications that host user-generated content have one way or another had 
to negotiate the line between free expression on the one hand and inclusion 
on the other.82
In this way, provider moderation inverts the laissez-faire concerns 
about content regulation because it protects users against the chill 
occasioned by abusive or harassing online conduct.  Moderation in this 
                                                                                                                         
79 Warzel, supra note 75 (“In response to the ban, scorned redditors flooded the site, using the 
site’s voting mechanisms to post crude racist and sexist comments disparaging Pao.  Renderings of the 
CEO as a communist leader quickly hit the site’s front page.  Subreddits like /r/PaoYongYang and 
/r/EllenPao_IsA_Cunt popped up as well as petitions calling for her resignation.”).
80 Id.
81 In response to similar content policy reforms by other such providers, some users have begun to 
lament the end of the World Wide Web or even the internet as a space for free online expression.  See, 
e.g., Kalev Leetaru, How Twitter’s New Censorship Tools Are the Pandora's Box Moving Us Towards 
the End of Free Speech, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:02 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/02/17/how-twitters-new-censorship-tools-are-the-
pandoras-box-moving-us-towards-the-end-of-free-speech/#45f47d2bc1e4 (discussing Twitter’s efforts 
to censor unacceptable speech).
82 See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, Twitter Suspends Alt-Right Accounts, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2016, 
8:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/11/15/twitter-suspends-alt-right-
accounts/93943194/ (discussing Twitter’s suspension of accounts associated with the alt-right 
movement); Sarah Perez, One of the Worst Comments Sections on the Internet is Shutting Down, TECH 
CRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/03/one-of-the-worst-comments-sections-on-
the-internet-is-shutting-down/ (discussing Amazon’s decision to close IMDb’s discussion board due to 
prevalent hateful speech).  Sometimes Facebook’s automated monitoring of user content backfires.  
This has been the subject of broad public scrutiny very recently.  In late 2016, its popular Safety Check 
feature mistakenly linked to false news stories about an explosion in Bangkok.  Daniel Victor, 
Facebook’s Safety Check, Now Automated, Turns a Firecracker into an Explosion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world/asia/facebook-safety-check-bangkok.html?_r=0.  
The reported explosion actually occurred in the preceding year.  Facebook’s News Feed and Trending 
features also have come under fire in the United States for promoting and circulating “fake news.”  The 
company has implemented fixes for both, with fact-verification techniques drawing the most attention.  
See Amber Jamieson & Olivia Solon, Facebook to Begin Flagging Fake News in Response to 
Mounting Criticism, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-news-fact-check (discussing Facebook’s efforts to fairly and
accurately fact check news reports).
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regard is anything but passive.  
But moderation can only go so far in regulating online content and 
conduct.  It is, after all, mostly just reactive.  This is where application 
design matters.  It is one thing for a provider to take down user content that 
is inconsistent with content guidelines after it is has been posted.  It is 
another thing altogether to design the application to elicit or shape user 
content or, conversely, ensure that certain kinds of content never see the 
light of day.  Application designs determine the form and substance of user 
content.83
Consider the ways in which intermediaries that allow users to post 
material anonymously or pseudonymously are likely to host abusive or 
objectionable content.84 Users who post harmful or illegal content
reasonably assume that anonymity and pseudonymity safeguard them from 
shame and rebuke.85 In this way, such design features have much to 
commend them.  They disinhibit users from the censorship of “political 
correctness.”  They embolden users to articulate ideas and views that they
would otherwise keep silent.
Application design, of course, also directly determines the form by 
which users express themselves.  Twitter, for example, defines the way in 
which its users communicate. Users may communicate through tweets that
now must be no more than 280 characters long for distribution to either 
followers or to the public at large.86 The service, moreover, enables users 
to retweet others’ 280-character missives or “embed” others’ tweets in 
other applications.87 Or users may share ideas through direct messages to 
discrete Twitter users.88 Twitter optimizes all of this activity for use on 
                                                                                                                         
83 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 508–09 (1999) (explaining how software design can regulate user conduct).
84 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(describing how Dirty World obtained stories and gossip from anonymous users).  Survey data strongly 
suggests that online harassment is pervasive. A Pew Research Center study found, for example, that 
almost three-quarters of American adult internet users had witnessed online harassment and that two 
out of five had experienced it themselves.  Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CENT. (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/23/12113/.
85 It is unclear whether users engage or are inclined to engage in this kind of antisocial behavior 
online in ways that they would rarely engage in the physical world.  See, e.g., Lee Rainie, Janna 
Anderson, & Jonathan Albright, The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online,
PEW RESEARCH CENT. (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-
speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/ (discussing the difference between online and face-to-
face social conduct); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 
(2009).
86 New User FAQs, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920 (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2017).
87 FAQs About Retweets, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606 (last 
visited, Aug. 1, 2017).
88 New User FAQs, supra note 86.
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mobile devices.89
Contrast these design features with an online publishing platform like 
Medium, owned by Twitter’s founders.90 On the one hand, like Twitter, 
Medium leaves it to users to create and edit their own content.91 But 
Medium also allows long-form content and stories that are a contrast to the 
characteristically punchy syntax of tweets.92 Medium also supports its own 
original journalism and content.93 (Twitter, meanwhile, mainly indexes 
trending news and user activity.)94 Furthermore, Medium enables users to 
upvote and share content through Twitter and Facebook.95 In all of these 
ways, then, we can say that Twitter is far more implicated in the user’s 
choice of form and modes of distribution of content than Medium is. 
Indeed, the former’s designers appear far more engaged in developing 
ways to enable easy and wide distribution of tweets.  
Next, contrast Twitter and Medium with so-called ephemeral 
messaging applications like Snapchat and Confide—apps that enable users 
to distribute content that is only accessible to chosen recipients for a short 
period of time, and not, as in the case of most messaging applications, 
indefinitely.96 Ephemeral messaging reflects a distinctive view about how 
user-generated content may (and perhaps ought to) be shared and retained.
It makes the detection of illicit online conduct harder to record and, in this 
way, encourages users to post provocative or otherwise embarrassing 
content.97
An application’s design today reflects its developers’ priorities.  The 
form in which users can communicate (short form or long form? 
anonymous or not?), the scope of other users to which users can distribute 
content (to discrete application users or the public at large?), and the 
availability of content over time (ephemeral messaging or not?) reflect 
application developers’ view about how they want or expect users to 
                                                                                                                         
89 Notifications on Mobile Devices, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/
articles/20169887 (last visited, Aug. 1, 2017).
90 Josh Halliday, Twitter Founders Launch Two New Websites, Medium and Branch, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2012/aug/15/
twitter-founders-new-branch-medium.
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92 Drew Olanoff, Ev Williams Takes To Medium To Discuss The True Purpose Of His New 
Publishing Tool, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 15, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/11/15/ev-williams-
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93 Id.
94 New User FAQs, supra note 86.
95 Olanoff, supra note 92.
96 Frequently Asked Questions, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com/faq (last visited Aug. 1, 2017); 
Elise Moreau, What is Snapchat? An Intro to The Popular Ephemeral App, LIFEWIRE (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-snapchat-3485908.
97 Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Instagram Takes Aim at Snapchat with Live Video and Vanishing 
Photos, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/instagram-takes-aim-at-snapchat-
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express themselves. Today, therefore, a provider’s decision to design an 
application to be ostensibly agnostic about its users’ illicit content or 
online behavior suggests passivity.  But it also conveys the knowing 
expectation that users will post illegal and taboo online content.98
This is to say that, today, online intermediaries are not mere conduits 
that purport to provide a free and uninhibited forum for social interaction.
They are implicated in every user utterance or act, even if they do not 
moderate posts.   
C. Antisocial Designs
But we can go even further in our account of service or application 
designs.  Sometimes, as I suggest above, developers’ designs encourage 
user content that causes material injury, as in the case of the Twitter user 
who sent a direct message containing an animated strobe-light effect to a
journalist known to suffer from epilepsy.99 It is in spite of these potential 
harms, however, that the social media company enables its users to 
disguise their identities.  Twitter does so in the interest of cultivating a 
forum for uninhibited online interaction, knowing all along someone will 
inevitably get hurt.
Anonymity or pseudonymity can be dangerous.  Other application 
designs also facilitate predictable harms.  Consider the way in which users 
search for rides and guests through ride-sharing applications and 
short-term homestay marketplaces.  One recent study found that 
African-American passengers in Seattle wait up to 35-percent longer for 
                                                                                                                         
98 There are some providers that have remained indifferent if not altogether defiant about hosting 
illicit or otherwise objectionable third-party content.  These companies purport to do nothing more than 
connect users, many of whom happen to have objectionable tastes.  While large providers like 
YouTube or Facebook may be wary of broad consumer distaste for objectionable content that passes 
through their applications, others are not because there is monetizable demand for it.  Such a provider 
can create an adults-only or otherwise restricted platform through which users may trade and share 
taboo or objectionable material.  But such a service would likely not last long.  Consider Craigslist, the 
online classified site.  It closed its adults-only section in 2010 after a series of shocking events arising 
from advertisements and solicitations on the site.  Claire Cain Miller, Craigslist Says It Has Shut Its 
Section for Sex Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/
business/16craigslist.html.  BackPage soon picked up where Craigslist left off, but its adults-only 
section did not last long after revelations about the way in which its users engaged in sex trafficking of 
minors.  Matt Hamilton, BackPage Shuts Down Adult Section, Citing Government Pressure and 
Unlawful Censorship Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-backpage-shutdown-20170109-story.html.
99 See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Newsweek Writer Going After Twitter User for Allegedly Causing 
Seizure, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/newsweek-writer-goes-twitter-user-allegedly-causing-seizure-957631 (reporting on Newsweek 
writer Kurt Eichenwald’s suit against a Twitter user who allegedly sent him an email intending to cause 
a seizure); Ana Silman, A Timeline of Leslie Jones’s Horrific Online Abuse, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 24, 
2016), http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/08/a-timeline-of-leslie-joness-horrific-online-abuse.html 
(reporting on the viciously racist and sexist internet trolling of actress and comedian Leslie Jones).
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Uber cars than white passengers.100 The researchers attributed the longer 
wait time to drivers who cancel trips upon hearing that the passenger has 
an “African American sounding first name.”101 Male passengers who 
requested a ride from a low-density area, moreover, were more than 
three-times as likely to have the Uber driver cancel the trip when the 
passenger uses an African-American-sounding name as compared to a 
white-sounding name.102
An even more publicized survey by scholars at Harvard Business 
School reported similar findings in its review of rental booking patterns on 
Airbnb, the homestay sharing application.103 According to the report, 
Airbnb guests “with distinctively African-American names are 16-percent
less likely to be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively 
White names.”104 Airbnb’s own study on the topic found, moreover, that 
hosts discriminate against racial minorities whose profile pictures 
ostensibly present themselves as such.105
In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the choice to publicize personal 
information through names and pictures is a design choice.  In the case of 
Airbnb in particular, user pictures are meant to engender a sense of 
authenticity and connection among hosts and guests.106 (This is in contrast 
to the authenticity that Twitter seeks to engender through pseudonymity.)  
But, of course, it is in this same way that Uber drivers and Airbnb hosts 
might eschew connections with people with whom they feel less 
comfortable on the basis of racist stereotypes.  The features that mean to 
foster authentic connection also reinforce bias and exclusion. 
Facebook offers a compelling illustration of this point as well.  The 
online social networking application is well-known for its mission to 
connect the world.107 With this ambition in mind, the company has 
invested a substantial amount of resources into developing features (e.g., 
the scrolling News Feed or Trending feature) and services (e.g., Free 
Basics) that are meant to keep users connected.108
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108 See Newsroom, A New Look for News Feed, FACEBOOK (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/03/a-new-look-for-news-feed/ (discussing new features of the 
Facebook News Feed design implemented in 2013); see also Facebook For Developers, What’s Free
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Ostensibly in keeping with this practice, the company launched an 
advertising service in 2014.109 Through it, advertisers may “microtarget” 
small or fleeting niche audiences that might otherwise be hard to reach.110
Facebook assigns an “affinity” designation by applying proprietary tools 
for algorithmic analysis to its vast reserve of user data.111 The company 
forms the affinities around a particularly salient bundle of user data.112
The users to whom the advertisements are distributed play no active role in 
determining the designations that Facebook assigns them.113 They only 
need to keep liking, sharing, scrolling, and building friend networks—that 
is, they only need to continue using the social media application.114
Controversially, Facebook’s service offers “ethnic affinities” as a 
category which advertisers can use to microtarget their campaigns.115
Through the advertising service, a hypothetical business manager could 
distribute ads for a rental unit to users with an African-American “ethnic 
affinity” or, just as easily, exclude such users from the advertisement. 
Employers, too, could use the service to look for new recruits, again, 
singling out users for inclusion or exclusion based on the category 
designation.
While the advertising service has been available since 2014,
ProPublica’s reporting on this feature of the service in late 2016 drew a lot 
of attention.116 Public reaction to the report was mixed, if not altogether 
negative.117 Within one month, Facebook discontinued the “ethnic 
affinity” designation and clarified its privacy and advertising policy to 
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2018] INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES 229
make plain that it does not approve of racial discrimination.118 It later 
launched a new “multicultural affinity” filter, ostensibly to be less 
equivocal about the original classification.119 (“Multicultural” presumably 
connotes something more positive.) These reforms, however, were not 
enough to stop aggrieved users from filing a class-action lawsuit in the 
Northern District of California against Facebook (and brokers and lessors)
in late 2016.  Plaintiffs allege that, through the advertising service, 
Facebook enables users to discriminate against prospective renters and 
employers in violation of the federal FHA and antidiscrimination in 
employment provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.120 One year 
later, Facebook reportedly continues to enable discrimination against 
protected classes under the FHA.121
Facebook has three overlapping answers to the charge that it was or is
violating the FHA.  First, it observes that it is common for advertisers to 
target audiences in exactly the way that it did with the “ethnic affinities” 
feature.122 The fragmented and diverse nature of the market makes it 
important for advertisers to know their audience with more granularity.123
Thus, it argues, it is unremarkable to exclude, for example, the “Hispanic 
affinity group” from an English-language advertisement.124 Second, 
Facebook argues that its policies forbid “advertisers from using the 
targeting options for discrimination, harassment, disparagement or 
predatory advertising practices.”125 The company promptly removes such 
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ads (and perhaps even suspends or terminates accounts of violators) when 
it receives notice of them.126 Third, Facebook does not concede that 
“ethnic affinity” is protected under fair housing law.127 That designation 
“is not,” it argued, “the same as race.”128 It only represents an algorithmic 
judgment based on a mix of salient user data, in the same way, for 
example, that age, relationship status, employment history, or page-like 
patterns may suggest something about a user’s inclination to shop. 
We can assume for the purposes of argument that Facebook’s reasons 
for offering the advertising service are not overtly racist.  Nor does it seem 
that its design choices to identify “ethnic affinity” and enable advertisers to 
affirmatively exclude (as opposed to include) audiences on that basis were 
meant to discriminate against racial minorities.129 Facebook launched the 
advertising service presumably to leverage its social network in other lines 
of business.  In this case, Facebook probably believed that its distinctively 
powerful capacity to process and sort user data could enlarge users’ 
communicative capacity.  Facebook, under this view, was only acting as a 
mere conduit between advertisers and users.  
But such an approach is either naïve or careless or worse.  It was 
predictable to the point of being inevitable that advertisers would use 
Facebook’s “ethnic” or “multicultural affinity” classifications to 
discriminate against people of color.  Today, race overdetermines the 
distribution of material resources in this country to the systemic detriment 
of people of color.  Well-documented patterns of racial discrimination 
online prove the point. A Stanford study from 2010 found that black 
sellers receive fewer offers and less money than white sellers when the 
seller’s race is evident in an accompanying photo.130 Consider, moreover,
the ways in which users discriminate against blacks on online dating sites 
like Match.  Or consider crowdsourced neighborhood safety rating 
applications like the now-defunct SketchFactor that served as little more 
than a platform for racist stereotypes about “shady” parts of town.131
This recent Facebook advertising episode just underscores that, in its 
purported role as conduit between advertisers and buyers, Facebook 
facilitates material bias against disfavored groups.  More pertinently, it 
                                                                                                                         
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 For equal protection and civil rights enforcement, Facebook’s intentions would matter a great 
deal.
130 See Louis Bergeron, Online Shoppers More Likely to Buy from White Sellers than Black, 
Stanford Researchers Say, STANFORD NEWS (July 19, 2010), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/july/
hands-craigslist-study-071910.html (discussing research later published in Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke 
C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. 469 (2013)). 
131 Andrew Marantz, When an App Is Called Racist, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-to-do-when-your-app-is-racist.
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illustrates that ostensibly passive application design is far more generative 
of bad behavior than the Section 230 doctrine adequately addresses.  This 
recent controversy raises questions about the scope of immunity under 
Section 230 as it relates to application design.132 But, before saying more, 
it is important to understand the current immunity doctrine and how it 
came to take this form. I turn to that next.
II. THE PREVAILING IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Courts have read Section 230 broadly on the theory that online 
intermediaries should not be held liable if, as publishers, they are mere 
conduits for user-generated content.  The current doctrine specifically 
provides that intermediaries are only liable if they materially contribute to 
the illegal or otherwise objectionable online conduct.133 Courts reason that 
online entrepreneurship and speech would be chilled if providers had the 
heavy burden of policing their users’ online content.134 In this Part, I
explain the manner in which the courts have come to this standard. This 
analysis also offers important lessons on whether the doctrine has anything 
to say about the duties intermediaries owe for their designs.  Could courts 
apply the material contribution standard to each design? If so, how 
affecting must that design be in order for an intermediary to be liable for 
the unlawful conduct of its third-party users?   
                                                                                                                         
132 We can expect Facebook to invoke Section 230 in its defense of the Northern District of 
California suit.  The company has not been shy about relying on that provision in other cases addressed 
to the illegal behavior of third-party Facebook users.  See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that Section 230 mandated dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence claims 
against Facebook); Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
15, 2009) (dismissing a defamation action against Facebook, again due to its immunity from suit under 
Section 230).
133 See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a 
website operator is in part responsible for the creation or development of content, then it is an 
information content provider as to that content—and is not immune from claims predicated on it.” 
(citation omitted)).  
134 Id. at 407, 417.
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A. The Statutory Text
The pertinent provision, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), is entitled “Protection for 
‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.”135 The 
plain language is relatively straightforward.  Section 230(c)(1), whose 
subtitle is “Treatment of publisher or speaker,” provides: “No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”136 Under the statute, an “interactive computer service” mainly 
denotes services that “provide[] access to the Internet.”137
Section 230(c)(1) does far more work than its plain language suggests.  
The term “publisher or speaker” refers to an entity that participates in or 
authorizes the publication of content.138 It is generally associated with the 
claim for defamation, which, to be successful, requires evidence of the 
intentional or negligent publication of defamatory material about a plaintiff 
to a third person.139
Under the “republication rule” in defamation law the duties of a 
“publisher” are especially important.  A publisher, the rule holds, is strictly 
liable for repeating defamatory statements by third parties to the extent the 
publisher intentionally circulates the material or just fails to take 
reasonable care to prevent its publication.140 Publishers in this scheme 
include book publishers, newspapers, radio or television stations, and other 
entities that exercise editorial control over the content that they publish.141
A publisher is in this way just as liable for circulating the defamatory 
statements as the entity who originally authored them.142 The rule exists to 
protect others from the harm done by the repeated distribution of an illegal 
                                                                                                                         
135 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2017).
136 Id. § 230(c)(1).
137 The pertinent definition of “interactive computer service” under the statute is as follows: 
“[A]ny information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides 
access to the internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).
138 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520 (Cal. 2006) (“Those terms, employed in section 
230(c)(1), are drawn from the law of defamation.”).  There are reasons to doubt that defamation should 
be our guide, at least because the provision here refers to “publisher or speaker,” the latter not being 
tied to defamation doctrine.  See id. at 513 (emphasis added) (providing a statement by Congress in the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996).
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
140 See id. § 578; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984) (detailing the basis of liability).
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A; id. § 577A.
142 See id. § 578.  See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Lecture, Online Defamation, Legal 
Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV 1 (2016) (performing a thorough analysis of 
republication rule). 
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utterance.143 Without the rule, the logic goes, “defamers could too easily 
sidestep any possible liability by putting words into another’s mouth.”144
The old common law rule carved out a species of publisher that 
distributes or otherwise “deliver[s] or transmit[s]” defamatory material 
published by a third person.145 These distributors, as they are called in the 
doctrine, are only liable to the extent they know or have reason to know 
that the material is illegal.146 That is, they are subject to notice liability.
Conventional examples of distributors are newsstands and bookstores.147
A distributor, under this view, could not be liable for distributing a user’s 
defamatory statement about a third party unless the aggrieved party could 
show that the distributor’s failure to know of the defamatory nature of the 
statement was negligent or that the distributor failed to remove the material 
once it gained knowledge of it.148 Publishers, on the other hand, could be 
liable whether they know the material is defamatory or not.  
Section 230(c)(1) reforms the old common law by effectively shielding 
providers of “interactive computer services” from liability for content that 
third-party users circulate through the online service.149 The statute further 
clarifies the extent of this immunity in its definition of “information 
content provider,” which it describes as “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”150 With this, a provider could be liable for content that 
appears on its service to the extent the provider actively helps in the 
“creation or development” of the objectionable material.151
Alone, this reform of the republication rule would be significant. 
Section 230(c)(1) shields service providers from liability for exercising 
editorial judgment about content.  A service will only be liable to the 
extent it is responsible at least in part for the “creation or development” of 
the content that it publishes.152
                                                                                                                         
143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 576; id. § 577.
144 Zipursky, supra note 142, at 5. 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578; see also Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. 
State Med. Ass’n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (“Those who merely deliver or transmit 
defamatory material previously published by another will be considered to have published the material 
only if they knew, or had reason to know, that the material was false and defamatory.”).
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581; see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 
(Cal. 2006) (“Under the common law, ‘distributors’ like newspaper vendors and book sellers are liable 
only if they had notice of a defamatory statement in their merchandise.”). 
147 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 513.   
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2).
149 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017).  The statute explicitly preempts state tort law. Section 230(e)(3) 
provides, among other things, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3). 
150 Id. § 230(f)(3).
151 Id.
152 Id. 
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As significant as the reform in Section 230(c)(1) is, a couple 
subsequent provisions do more.  Section 230(c)(2), entitled “Civil 
liability,”153 takes up Section 230(c)’s evocative “Good Samaritan”154 title 
in ways that Section 230(c)(1) does not.155 Quite unlike Section 230(c)(1), 
Section 230(c)(2) identifies specific circumstances for applying the 
immunity: that is, when an interactive computer service takes steps in good 
faith to take down objectionable material or help others to do so.156 This 
immunity presumably exists for blocking and removing constitutionally 
protected material like core political speech as well as speech like 
defamation or obscenity that is not protected.157 Section 230(c)(2), 
moreover, shields interactive computer services to the extent they “enable 
or make available to information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).”158
Section 230(d), the following subsection, obliges interactive computer 
services to inform their users that “computer hardware, software, or 
filtering services” exist to “limit[] access to material that is harmful to 
minors.”159 This provision does not come paired with an enforcement 
mechanism.  Nor, for that matter, do Sections 230(c)(1) or 230(c)(2)(A).
But those two latter provisions operate as affirmative defenses, to be 
invoked by interactive computer services in litigation.  Section 230(d), on 
the other hand, reads as little more than a strongly worded but 
unenforceable mandate.  
In any event, both (c) and (d), and especially the former, presume that 
voluntary market-driven norms will guide the regulation of objectionable 
online content rather than government enforced mandates.  They depend 
on interactive computer services for their implementation.  While the 
online setting has been relatively new to the common law, the challenge of 
encouraging (without requiring) good deeds through law is not.160 The 
Good Samaritan statutes in the states long preceded the internet.161
Through these, state legislatures sought to balance competing 
considerations in ways that are instructive.  On the one hand, the states 
                                                                                                                         
153 Id. § 230(c)(2).
154 Id § 230(c). 
155 The latter makes no allusion at all to the biblical parable.  See Luke 10:25–37.
156 Section 230(c)(2) shields interactive computer services that have voluntarily taken steps in 
good faith to censor or take down “material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
157 Id.
158 Id. § 230(c)(2)(B).
159 Id. § 230(d).
160 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
161 Zipursky, supra note 142, at 31. 
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have wanted to encourage strangers to help victims.  On the other, the 
common law does not impose duties to help strangers in need.162 Instead, 
do-gooders can be liable under common law for causing injuries that arise 
from their efforts to treat down-and-out strangers with kindness.163 Thus, 
in the face of a common-law rule that arguably disincentivizes the 
Good Samaritan, state legislatures have passed laws that one way or 
another shield defendant do-gooders from liability.164
Section 230(c)(2) embodies this same effort, but in the online setting. 
It ostensibly aims to preserve the affirmative duty to restrict access to 
objectionable content to the extent the defendant service at issue “has 
undertaken to” do so.165
This approach distinguishes Section 230 from most other provisions 
addressed to illegal or objectionable content in the Communications Act. 
Other parts of the statute, for example, strictly bar the transmission of 
obscenity, child pornography, or harassing content and, moreover, 
explicitly enlist officials at the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Communications Commission to impose financial penalties on violators 
and bring criminal and civil forfeiture actions.166 In contrast, government 
regulators play no part in monitoring and regulating content that users 
share over the internet through “interactive computer services.”167
B. Legislative Intent
1. Prefatory Words
It is not easy to balance the interest in promoting user-generated 
content against the voluntary regulation of objectionable online content.  
But that is exactly what the drafters of Section 230 purported to do.  
Congress explicitly set out the findings and policies on which it based the 
immunity in Sections 230(a) and (b).  The internet, the statute asserts, 
affords users “a great degree of control over” the “extraordinary” array of 
“educational and informational resources” they receive.168 This finding 
restates one of the foundational design principles of the internet: that the 
substantive intelligence of information networks should reside with end-
                                                                                                                         
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 35.
166 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(b)(6) (2017) (discussing prohibited acts and the Attorney 
General’s authority to enforce the statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2017) (discussing prohibitions against the 
broadcasting obscene language).
167 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017) (stating that users of an interactive computer service will not 
be considered a “publisher or speaker” of any information provided by another information content 
provider).
168 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(1)–(3).
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users and not, as had been the case, in the central offices of newspaper 
publishers or broadcast producers, for example.  This approach jibes, too, 
with an emergent liberal political theory with which this engineering 
concept is often associated.169 Indeed, along these lines, Congress 
observed in their statutory findings that the internet is a “forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”170 This 
statutory recital has been an article of faith among policymakers and lay 
observers, at least since the Supreme Court’s first prominent take on the 
technology two decades ago.171 Congress also found in this section that the 
“variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services” 
online have “flourished . . . with a minimum of government regulation.”172
Section 230(b) enumerates the policies underlying the protection for 
intermediaries.  There, legislators provide that the statute’s aim is “to 
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media”;173 “preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation”;174 and to “maximize user control over what information is 
received by individuals, families, and schools,” which includes 
encouraging “the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material . . . .”175 Finally, through 
Section 230, Congress sought “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and 
harassment by means of computer.”176
As clear as these introductory provisions are, courts have yet to cohere 
them (at least explicitly) with the legislative purpose that the New Deal-era 
Congress explicitly set out in Section 151 of the Communications Act, the 
first provision of the statute that Section 230 amends.177 That older 
provision mainly provides that the purpose of the statute is “to ensur[e] that 
communication technology is widely available to all users irrespective of 
                                                                                                                         
169 See YOCHAI BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS 133 (2006) (discussing individual agency, 
technology, and the rights of end-users versus publishers and broadcasters).
170 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(1)–(3). 
171 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–850 (1997) (discussing the role of the internet and how 
access provides opportunities to users).
172 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(4)–(5).
173 Id. § 230(b)(1).
174 Id. § 230(b)(2).
175 Id. § 230(b)(3)–(4).
176 Id. § 230(b)(5).
177 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652–654 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (rejecting the argument that Sections 151 and 230 authorized the agency action at issue). 
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who or where they are.”178 This language is not in tension with the 
“findings” or “policy” underlying Section 230.  It nevertheless suggests 
that, to the extent courts attend to the statutory purposes of Section 230, 
they would do well to consider the distributional interests that rest at the 
heart of the Communications Act, of which Section 230 is just a part.
2. Legislative History
These prefatory terms are notable for their clarity.179 But they are 
especially valuable because the legislative history of Section 230 is 
relatively spare on what Congress meant to accomplish with the statute.  
To the extent the legislative history suggests anything, it does not square 
easily with all of the plain language.
The bill that would become Section 230 was part of a much larger 
legislative reform of communications law addressed in particular to 
competition in the market for last-mile telecommunications service.180
Senators James Exon and Slade Gorton introduced the bill, Title V of the 
proposed Telecommunications Act, to the Senate Committee of 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.181 Among other things, the 
Exon-Gorton bill contained government-enforced restrictions on indecent 
and obscene online speech, as well as the enforcement provisions to which 
I allude above.182 But it also included two new defenses to liability: first, 
an immunity for providers that only supply internet access and, second, an 
immunity for providers that take good-faith efforts to prevent third-party 
users’ publication of obscene or indecent material.  
The House bill that went to conference also contained an immunity 
provision.183 But Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden only 
moved to include it after the House Energy and Commerce Committee had 
already reported the pertinent bill out to the full chamber without one.184
Cox and Wyden intended their proposed language to be an alternative to 
                                                                                                                         
178 Sylvain, supra note 43, at 459.
179 See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 652–54 (discussing statutory terms and the areas over which 
the FCC has authority); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing statutory 
terms and the areas that fall within the purview of the FCC).
180 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (enacting the 
Communications Decency Act as Section V of the overall reform act).
181 See 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) (introducing the 
Communications Decency Act on behalf of himself and Senator Gorton).
182 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (striking down obscenity and indecency laws 
within one year of their implementation).
183 See 104 CONG. REC. H8469 (statement of Rep. Cox) (reading the proposed amendment, which 
contained a Good Samaritan immunity provision).
184 See id. at H8468 (statement of Rep. Cox) (offering an amendment after the reading of the bill 
to include the Good Samaritan provision, in addition to others).
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the Exon-Gorton language.185 Its main purpose was to overrule a 1995 
New York state trial court opinion that had found Prodigy, an early online 
service, liable for defamatory statements made by another user on one of 
the service’s bulletin board services.186 Relying on the common law 
regarding publisher liability, that court had decided that Prodigy was a 
“publisher” and, thus, just as liable for libelous statements made by any of 
its subscribers. The court explained, moreover, that Prodigy had marketed 
itself as having editorial control over the content that flowed through its 
service and, as a result, should be held to account for failing to remove the 
offending content.187
Representatives Cox and Wyden saw the Prodigy opinion as a 
dangerous incursion on the free flow of information online.188 They, as 
with the then-nascent internet industry, believed that the opinion would
open the door to litigation against well-meaning services. The Cox-Wyden 
bill sought to encourage private “Good Samaritan” providers like Prodigy 
to filter objectionable content without fear of punishment for doing so 
ineffectively.189 Above all, Cox and Wyden proposed the bill as an 
alternative to direct government restrictions on speech, believing that 
“parents and families are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace 
and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats.”190 Under the 
approach set out in their amendment, they explained, “the marketplace is 
going to give parents the tools they need,” while the alternative set out by 
the Senate bill would “set back the effort to help our families.”191
                                                                                                                         
185 See id. at H8470 (statement of Rep. Cox) (comparing their approach with that of “other ways 
to address this problem”); id. (statement of Rep. Wyden) (noting that their proposal language in the 
House “stand[s] in sharp contrast to the work of the other body”).
186 See id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (discussing the purposes of the proposed amendment).
187 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995), superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New 
York, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281 (2011).
188 See 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox.) (discussing disincentives that 
exist in the legal system that prevent free-flowing online information).
189 See id. (discussing the protection of Good Samaritans, online service providers that take steps 
to screen offensive material for customers).
190 Id. (statement of Rep. Wyden); see also id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[The proposed bill] will 
establish as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the 
Federal Government of what is on the internet, that we do not wish to have a Federal Computer 
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the internet because frankly the internet as grown 
up to be what it is without that kind of help from the Government. In this fashion we can encourage 
what is right now the most energetic technological revolution that any of us has ever witnessed.”).
191 Id.  Their justification was (and remains) at odds with the federal courts’ holding that direct 
government regulation of indecency and obscenity furthers the government’s compelling interest in 
parental control of the information to which children are exposed.  See, e.g., Sable Communications v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 119 (1989) (discussing the government’s interest in protecting users of online 
service providers from indecent material); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (discussing the 
government’s interest in protecting the well-being of online service providers by regulating protected 
expression); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 629 (1968) (discussing the use of government 
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The conference committee bill that both chambers approved 
incorporated the Cox-Wyden formulation.192 The accompanying report 
explained that “one of the specific purposes” of the amendment was to 
overrule the Prodigy opinion in order to further the “important federal 
policy of empowering parents to determine the content of communications 
their children receive through interactive computer services.”193 This 
statement of purpose underscores that legislators mainly chose against a 
flat-out restriction on objectionable material. The drafters believed that 
parents are the better stewards of the online content that their children 
consume than governmental officials.  
But neither the conference committee report nor legislators’ statements 
about the amendment reveal anything about the scope of notice liability for 
service providers or the affirmative duty of interactive service providers to 
screen objectionable content. That is, neither says anything about how 
proactively interactive computer services like Prodigy must monitor 
third-party users’ content on their services or filter out objectionable 
material under the new law.  
We might assume that this silence suggests that the amendment 
immunizes all providers from any liability arising from third-party content. 
But this is hard to square with a plain reading of the statute. Section 
230(c)(2)(A) encourages websites to keep objectionable content out 
without fear of liability for failing to do so well. The following provision, 
Section 230(c)(2)(B), immunizes services that “make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict” 
objectionable content. The plain language of (c)(2) suggests that these are 
the operative reasons for immunity.194
The legislative history also offers little in the way of explanation for 
these specific provisions. Again, the history only suggests that Congress 
did not want the Prodigy court’s unforgiving interpretation of the 
republication rule in the online setting to stand. To the extent members 
said anything about the bill, it was that they were interested in enacting a 
statutory scheme that would empower parents to monitor their children’s 
access to online content over a scheme that encouraged or even required 
websites to assume that responsibility.195 This stated purpose does not help 
                                                                                                                         
regulations to protect minors from harmful material).  The scheme that Cox and Wyden laid out 
invoked the parental control rationale to remove government speech regulation.
192 See 142 CONG. REC. S687, S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (discussing the passage of the bill by 
the two houses).  
193 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-58, at 194 (1996).
194 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(2)(a)–(b) (2012).
195 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (discussing the trend in Constitutional interpretation recognizing 
parents’ authority to decide what negative content children are exposed to); Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639 
(describing the parents’ authority to direct the rearing of their children as basic in the structure of our 
society).
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shed light on whether services that do not take steps in good faith to filter 
out objectionable content (firms unlike Prodigy) are entitled to the 
immunity under Section 230. Consider that, four years before the state 
court weighed in, a U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York had ruled that a similar service, CompuServe, could not be held liable 
to the extent it did not market or distribute defamatory material by 
third-party users.196
Congress only further complicated things when, in 1998, it amended 
Section 230 (for the first and last time) with a new subsection (d) which, as 
I explain above, requires providers to inform their users about filtering 
technologies.197 This requirement is mostly toothless, as Congress did not 
pair it with an enforcement mechanism.  And it only appears to be 
addressed to the kind of unprotected content that the courts and 
policymakers believe harms children (i.e., obscenity and indecency), not 
all other categories of objectionable or illegal speech. So, while it 
reinforces the view that Congress was primarily focused on making parents 
the stewards of the information that their children receive online on the one 
hand, the provision does not explain how far providers must go or whether 
immunity under Section 230(c) is conditioned on giving notice to users 
about parental control protections. 
C. Statutory Ambiguities
The thinness of the legislative history on service providers’ affirmative 
duties to moderate content under Section 230 created an opening for 
litigants.  There is little question that Congress sought to “modernize” the 
republication rule in the final language.  But how far did the reform go?  
The exact scope of protection under the plain terms of the provision is not 
evident from the text and the legislative history teaches us little.  In order 
to know whether it covers application design, however, the answer to that 
question is important if not dispositive.
1. Which Torts?
We do not know from its text, for example, whether Section 230(c) 
immunizes service providers from all tort liability arising from third-party 
user content. On the one hand, Section 230(c)(1) is unequivocal, asserting 
without qualification that “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information 
                                                                                                                         
196 Cubby v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
197 See supra Section II.A (discussing a lack of an explicit enforcement mechanism in the 
language of the statute). 
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provided by another information content provider.”198 This presumably 
covers all torts arising from expressive acts by third parties.  
But there is also enough in the statute to limit the scope of the 
protection to publisher liability in defamation law, as well as liability for 
publishing third-party indecency and obscenity. First, the question of 
whether a service may be treated as a “publisher or speaker” is specific to 
the doctrine of defamation.  It is not germane to other torts like fraud or 
unfair competition. Nor is it clear whether this sense of “publisher” 
includes notice liability normally associated with distributors in defamation 
law. Courts could just decide that the statute does not reach further than 
publisher liability for defamation or other reputational torts, thus exposing 
distributors and others to liability. Second, if the legislative history of 
Section 230(c) teaches anything certain, it is that Congress sought to 
overturn the Prodigy court’s application of defamation to an online bulletin 
board.  We can infer from this alone that defamation was the cause of 
action that drove Congress to act.
The only other expressive torts to which Congress explicitly turned its
attention in the text are third-party communications that the courts have 
deemed “objectionable” or otherwise harmful to minors.  Section 
230(c)(2), the provision that shields Good Samaritans, and Section 230(d), 
the provision that imposes the obligation to notify parent users about 
filtering technologies, are both addressed to protecting minors from 
objectionable content.199 Recall, moreover, that the original Title V 
amendment included flat-out restrictions on the distribution of obscenity 
and indecency, categories of speech from which legislators have long 
sought to shield children.200 This earlier version of the bill covered nothing 
else.  Finally, in the precatory “policy” recitation at the outset of the 
statute, Congress sought to encourage “individuals, families, and schools” 
to use “blocking and filtering technologies” to protect children from 
“objectionable or inappropriate online material.”201 Congress endorsed this 
view in Section 230(d), the 1998 amendment, by imposing an additional 
duty on providers to educate parents about filtering technologies.202
With this textual evidence, we might not read Section 230(c) as 
unequivocal at all, but, rather, as limiting the range of protection to 
providers that, on the one hand, publish third-party communications that 
damage a plaintiff user’s reputation and, on the other hand, take good-faith 
steps to screen content that is “objectionable” or otherwise harmful to 
                                                                                                                         
198 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
199 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)–(d). 
200 The Supreme Court struck down that provision in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
201 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(3)–(4).
202 47 U.S.C. § 230(d).
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children.203 Congress was demonstrably mindful of those expressive torts 
in the text and legislative history and essentially silent about all others.  
This narrower interpretation of the statute follows the traditional canon 
of construction that legislators do not “hide elephants in mouse holes.”204
Congress would surely have been far more explicit about a broader scope 
of protection had it meant to so radically reform the republication rule.205
In any event, the narrower reading that I posit here would encourage the 
kind of sociability and altruism one would expect from a statutory 
provision that, in its title, explicitly seeks to protect Good Samaritans from 
liability for their good-faith efforts.  
2. How Much Creation and Development?
We also do not know from the statute’s plain terms or the legislative 
history what kind of activity constitutes “creation or development” under 
Section 230(f)(3), the statutory definition of “information content 
developer.”206 A website’s design necessarily determines the way in which 
users express themselves, whether by video, photo, text, or mere click, for 
example. After all, as I explain above, the form of an online 
communication (say, a Facebook advertisement, a Medium post, a Tweet, 
or a YouTube clip) is contingent on the interactive computer service’s 
design.207 This is to say nothing of the far thornier question of whether, 
today, at a time when algorithmic prediction and machine learning 
determine most users’ online experiences, interactive computer services
that employ these techniques are “creat[ing] or develop[ing]” content 
within the meaning of Section 230(f).208
D. Judicial Elaborations 
Courts have assumed the responsibility of determining whether and to 
what extent online intermediaries owe any affirmative duties to manage 
their users’ content or conduct. Over the past two decades, they have read 
                                                                                                                         
203 See Sherman v. Yahoo, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“A plain reading of the 
statute indicates protection is intended only for the ‘blocking and screening of offensive material.’”).
204 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citation omitted). 
205 See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1994) (discussing narrow exceptions in 
Communications Act as evidence of the narrow meaning of the operative term).  See also King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (discussing Congress’ tendency to avoid vague terms when 
altering regulatory schemes); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) 
(discussing Congress’ tendency to avoid making changes to a regulatory scheme in a cryptic fashion).
206 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
207 See supra Section B (discussing how application designs determine the form and substance of 
user content).  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing matchmaker website’s questionnaire and how it facilitated expression of information by 
individual users).
208 See supra Part I.
2018] INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES 243
the immunity under Section 230 broadly, despite the complications I 
suggest above.209 First, they generally hold that the statute shields services 
from liability for all expressive torts by third parties, not just those that are 
reputational or harmful to children. Second, most courts have determined 
that the statute shields companies that do anything but elicit illegal or 
objectionable content from third parties by design. So, it is not enough that 
a service’s administrators do not block or remove illegal content or, 
alternatively, solicit illicit material. Moderation of user content no longer 
seems to matter for the purposes of applying the immunity. Online 
intermediaries lose their immunity only if they have a hand in creating the 
illegal content or otherwise violate a separate duty that does not arise from 
the publishing event.210
This prevailing approach resonates with the longstanding skepticism in 
First Amendment doctrine of laws that have the effect of “chilling” 
conduct.211 Of course, the subject and scope of protection in the 
constitutional setting are meaningfully different from those under Section 
230. The constitutional provision establishes, among other things, a robust 
ex ante protection and affirmative defense from government “prior 
restraints” on speech.212 Congress enacted the CDA, on the other hand, to 
shield private online companies from ex post private law claims for the 
misdeeds of private third-party actors.
But the “chilling effects” logic is nevertheless apropos. Without a 
broad immunity from liability, the theory goes, online entrepreneurs may 
not have as strong a native incentive to develop new applications or 
                                                                                                                         
209 Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014); Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 
1100 (9th Cir. 2009); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 523 (Cal. 2006); Zeran v. America Online, 
129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
210 See Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (discussing services losing immunity for being partly responsible 
for the creation or development of harmful content). 
211 See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (“Faced with the penalties that 
would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the 
right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”); New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 300 (1964) (applying chilling effects analysis to 
defamation claim arising from major news paper’s publication of “matters of the highest public interest 
and concern”).  According to one law review article, the term “chilling effect” first appeared in a 
Supreme Court opinion on a First Amendment controversy in Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation 
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1963).  Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: 
Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect,, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978); see also Ciolli, supra note 2, at 137, 
148 (discussing the fear that over-censorship would hinder the open exchange of ideas on the internet); 
Kreimer, supra note 2, at 11, 47 (discussing the fear that censorship laws for online material could 
hinder free expression); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 986, 1013 (discussing the Court’s efforts to balance 
the risk of harmful online speech with the risk of hindering the free exchange of information); Wu, 
supra note 2, at 293, 300 (2011) (discussing the fear that imposing excessive liability for distributing 
harmful speech will cause the censorship of too much content).
212 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (describing immunity from restraints or 
censorship as a long-standing liberty of the press).
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services for fear of being sued.213 Under the glare of litigious users, these 
deep-pocketed companies would have to bear the responsibility of 
monitoring their users’ online behavior.  The social costs of such an 
arrangement would be great.  Service providers, whose interests do not 
necessarily align with those of their users, would censor their users for fear 
of being sued.214 They, moreover, would have to divert resources to 
defend the parade of lawsuits arising from illegal third-party conduct. This 
would be a burdensome task for most online applications, but it would be 
especially onerous for companies like Reddit or YouTube that host 
massive amounts of third-party user content. Fewer users would likely join 
such services, diminishing the value of online engagement.  
Empirically, it is hard to measure how innovative developers would be 
had Congress not enacted the CDA. The best we can do perhaps is 
compare online innovation in the U.S. with innovation in countries that do 
not have a similar immunity provision.215 But even that would not reveal 
much because, by the mid to late 1990s, internet entrepreneurs in the U.S. 
had already obtained an advantageous (if not dominant) market position. 
In any event, U.S. courts have eagerly drawn on the chilling effects 
reasoning to articulate an extremely robust conception of Section 230 
immunity.  
This broad reading, however, was never inevitable. Courts in the 
Anglo-American common law tradition have long concluded that 
employers, hosts, and other intermediaries may be jointly, vicariously, or 
secondarily liable for illegal third-party conduct, despite the burden of 
having to attend to all conduct (expressive or otherwise) on their premises 
or by their employees or in their publications.216 The reasons are obvious: 
intermediaries are often best able to curtail the costly effects of the 
underlying tort.217 We might expect for the same reason that courts would 
not find it difficult to hold online intermediaries liable for hosting illegal 
                                                                                                                         
213 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 987 (discussing the challenge of “[c]reating incentives and 
obligations for intermediaries” without violating free expression principles).
214 Wu, supra note 2, at 300.
215 Europe’s E-Commerce Directive, for example, establishes safe harbors for civil and criminal 
liability for third-party content. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market, 2000 O.J. L 178/1.  Those protections, however, are qualified by the nature of the 
intermediary and the underlying behavior.  Id. at L 178/3, ¶¶ 12–14.  
216 See Colleen E. Medill, The Federal Common Law of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Under 
ERISA, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254 (2011) (discussing the principal that a corporation is liable 
for the conduct of its agents while they act within the scope of their employment).  But see Doe v. GTE 
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing the tendency of federal courts to refrain from 
creating broad secondary liability in the absence of a specified statute).
217 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 
499, 500–01 (1961); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL L. REV.
1805 (2010).
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third-party content or conduct. It would be fully consistent with a 
longstanding rule that such services owe duties because of their relative 
position in the political economy for distribution information.218 Such a 
rule would not necessarily return us to Prodigy or the world before Section 
230. Under this approach, immunity under Section 230 would only apply 
to cases in which plaintiffs allege that defendants were negligent in the 
efforts to take down such content.219 And, today, with as much control as 
many providers have over their users’ content by moderation and design, it 
would not be surprising for such a rule to take hold. 
But the courts in the late 1990s chose a different path, even if 
sometimes begrudgingly.220 The prevailing view was (and remains) that 
the social costs of policing online content would be too great to justify 
imposing liability on intermediaries for illegal third-party content.221
Courts have found the old common-law tort view to be obsolete in the era 
of high-volume networked distribution of content, where the costs of 
policing bad actors are prohibitively expensive. They have read the 
immunity under Section 230 broadly, protecting service providers from 
liability for all third-party content to which they do not materially 
contribute.  And this immunity is not contingent on good-faith efforts to 
moderate or take down objectionable content or making filtering 
technologies available to users. The guiding principle has been to ensure 
that users benefit from unfettered online speech and innovation.222 The 
courts have concluded that reading the immunity broadly best achieves this 
end.
The courts’ role here has been significant. In the absence of clarity 
from Congress, their broad reading of immunity likely accelerated the 
development of no-frills services like Craigslist and Reddit that seemed to 
do no more than host and publish user-generated content.  By defining the 
immunity in the way that they did, the courts have been 
“technology-forcing,”223 directing Silicon Valley to safely develop 
                                                                                                                         
218 See Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Hellar v. Bianco, 244 
P.2d 757, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)).  It is ironic that the old common law rule imposed a duty on social 
hosts for the injuries caused by intoxicated guests to whom he or she has served liquor.  Today, at least 
in some circles, to say that an online service “hosts” content is to suggest that it does not bear 
responsibility for the bad actions of its users.  At least the etymology is intriguing.
219 See supra Section II.D (discussing service providers hosting illegal content being held liable if 
they have a hand in creating it).
220 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“If it were writing on 
a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. . . .  But Congress has made a different policy 
choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even 
aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.”).
221 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099–1100.
222 Id.
223 See Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983) (discussing the role of 
non-specific automobile safety standards in inducing the development of superior safety design).
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intermediary “Web 2.0” services that do little more than host 
user-generated content.  Of course, no matter how courts made sense of 
Section 230, their interpretations would have determined which sorts of 
applications would be winners and which would be losers in the 
Information Age. But there can be little question that, in the face of 
conflicting signals in the text and legislative history of the statute, the 
courts helped to determine the look and feel of the market during the 
crucial first decades after Congress enacted Section 230.  
In the remaining Sections of this Part, below, I analyze how courts 
have come to this point. In the end, I show that, by reading the statute in 
the way that they have, courts have effectively turned the Good Samaritan 
purposes of the statute on its head. The doctrine now immunizes service 
providers who are antisocial as much if not more than those that moderate 
content.224
1. The Zeran Framework 
The Fourth Circuit’s 1997 opinion in Zeran v. AOL is easily the most-
cited exemplar of the prevailing approach, even as the pertinent 
background facts in that case look relatively quaint in light of how existing 
online applications look and feel today.225 There, an anonymous AOL user 
posted false advertisements for lewd merchandise that celebrated the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing on one of many America Online electronic 
bulletin boards. This user then directed interested subscribers to contact an 
unwitting user, plaintiff Zeran, at the latter’s phone number.  After 
receiving harassing calls and death threats, Zeran asked AOL to take the 
false advertisements down, which AOL did.  But the anonymous originator 
continued to post new false advertisements over the next few days, 
requiring Zeran to contact AOL each time.  AOL took the advertisement 
down each time, but also refused to abide by Zeran’s request that the 
company issue a retraction or screen any future posts directed at him. 
Zeran accordingly sued a few months later, alleging several things, 
including that AOL, first, had a duty to take down all defamatory content 
as soon as it had notice of it, second, should have notified all AOL 
subscribers about the false nature of the advertisements, and, third, should 
have blocked all future defamatory statements about Zeran.  
                                                                                                                         
224 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
373, 379–80 (2010); Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization 
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 389–90 (2009); see also Danielle Citron, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1435, 1439 (2011) (discussing the freedom intermediaries have in choosing whether to challenge 
online speech).
225 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the 
claims.  Section 230, it held, shielded AOL from liability.  It did not matter 
that AOL had notice of the content. The statute, the panel explained, 
makes no distinction between a common law distributor and publisher.226
Congress meant to protect both, as distributor liability is a subset of 
publisher liability.227 Reciting the prefatory provisions of the statute, the 
court explained that the purpose of the statute was to keep government 
interference in the “burgeoning internet medium” to a minimum.  Judicial 
remedies for expressive torts, it continued, would undercut the “diversity 
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity” that Congress explicitly 
enumerated in the findings on which the immunity is based.228 The panel 
concluded, moreover, that Congress wrote the new statutory immunity to 
shield the likes of AOL from liability for the “millions” of expressive acts 
of third-party users that populate their service.  
Ever since, federal and state courts across the country have modelled 
their analysis of immunity on the Fourth Circuit’s.229 This was especially 
true in the decade or so after Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson penned his opinion 
in Zeran, when the technology of online information distribution did not 
change much.230 Defendant services generally invoked the immunity 
provision in disputes that began with a third-party user’s reputationally 
injurious statements about another discrete user. The providers and users 
of an interactive computer service in these early cases simply relayed other 
users’ online content.  The specific third-party tortfeasor’s expressive tort 
and the resultant injury on the plaintiff user were the bookends of the 
causal chain in these disputes.231
                                                                                                                         
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)).
229 See, e.g., Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).  This influence is probably an incident of 
the geography of internet entrepreneurship in the United States.  AOL, the largest internet service at the 
end of the 1990s, was (and remains) headquartered in Northern Virginia, which is in the Fourth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit, in which Silicon Valley sits, would also play an outsized role in defining the 
doctrine.
230 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
(discussing origin of the internet and the prevailing way through which most users access it).
231 Notably, this framework might also include the variety of other stakeholders who always play 
a constituent part in the transmission of information through and over the internet, including the 
broadband access providers for each respective user. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 
755 F.3d 398, 406 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014). But it does not necessarily include the long-haul network 
operators and administrators of internet traffic, or the domain registrar from which users get their 
domain names.  This latter group, one way or another, contributes to the delivery of the content and 
better resembles conduits than online providers of “interactive computer service” because domain 
registrars generally deliver content without regard to its contents.  
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As antiquated as an electronic bulletin board may seem to social media 
users today, the main doctrinal issues have not changed much since Zeran.  
In many regards, the longevity of this approach suggests that the Fourth 
Circuit got it right twenty years ago. Today, courts first ask whether the 
service is a “publisher” of the offending material and, second, whether and 
to what extent the interactive computer service “creat[ed] or develop[ed]” 
the offending content.232
The courts settled on the core of the current doctrine in the mid to late 
2000s. And, as I suggest above, they were likely motivated by the chilling 
effects line of argument as much as, if not more than, the plain text of 
Section 230(c). They have often parroted the statute’s prefatory language 
to observe that burdening services with the actionable legal duty to 
monitor, block, and take down all illegal third-party material would 
discourage innovation and entrepreneurship. Congress, they have 
explained, wanted the “burgeoning Internet medium” to thrive, undeterred 
by the chilling threat of litigation.233 A broad reading of immunity would 
best achieve these statutory purposes.234
                                                                                                                         
232 The question of whether the defendant “provider or user” is “responsible, in whole or in part,” 
for the objectionable content under Section 230(f)(3) is important, but mostly derivative of the second 
question above about creation and development.  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if the data are supplied by third 
parties, a website operator may still contribute to the content’s illegality and thus be liable as a 
developer . . . .”).  The question of who is a “user” under Section 230(c)(1) was once unclear, but has 
since been resolved.  The answer is: just about any entity, including natural persons, to whom a content 
developer “provides” the content for distribution. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 522 
(Cal. 2006) (“Congress implemented its intent not by maintaining the common law distinction between 
‘publishers’ and ‘distributors,’ but by broadly shielding all providers from liability for ‘publishing’ 
information received from third parties.”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Nothing in the text, legislative history, or human experience would lead me to accept the notion that 
Congress in § 230 intended to immunize users or providers of interactive computer services who, by 
their discretionary decisions to spread particular communications, cause trickles of defamation to swell 
into rivers of harm.”). 
233 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
234 The courts’ treatment of Section 230(d), an often-overlooked separate duty under the statute, 
also suggests that their reservations about imposing liability have likely not been particular to the text 
of the statute.  Section 230(d), remember, requires providers of interactive computer services to notify 
new users, particularly parents of young children, about existing filtering software. Courts have said 
little to nothing about the provision and, to the extent they have said anything, they have not been 
inclined to enforce the obligation on providers that fail to inform their new users about filters.  In 2013, 
for example, a Kentucky district court read Section 230(d) to mean that website operators would not 
receive immunity if they do not make attempts to screen third-party content and instead “invite 
invidious postings, elaborate on them with comments of their own, and call upon others to respond in 
kind.”  Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818, 822 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d
755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit has rejected this “encouragement theory.”  Id. at 413–
15 (reversing and vacating the district court’s decision).  In 2008, a federal district court in Utah found 
that a state law requiring internet service providers to provide filtering software (which they could do 
by “simply referring consumers to a third-party that provides filtering software when such software is 
requested”) was not inconsistent with Section 230(d).  Kings English, Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05-CV-
2018] INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES 249
On the basis of this reasoning, in the decisive first several years after
Congress enacted the statute, courts had no trouble shielding providers or 
users of interactive computer services from liability.235 Companies like 
America Online were the clear beneficiaries in cases brought by 
individuals and companies for reputation-damaging third-party content.236
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company v. America Online, for example,
plaintiff sought monetary and injunctive relief for the web portal’s 
publication of incorrect stock price and share volume information about 
plaintiff.237 It alleged that AOL was liable for defamation and negligence 
because it had a hand in creating or developing the stock information and 
routinely revised or removed information about companies when it learned 
from the third-party stock information providers about errors.238 The Tenth 
Circuit rejected plaintiff’s claim, explaining that communications with the
third-party content providers did not constitute development or creation 
under Section 230 and, in any case, by deleting incorrect information, AOL 
was “engaging in the editorial functions Congress sought to protect.”239
The court relied heavily on Zeran to support its conclusion.
The Section 230 defense also reached well beyond web portals like 
AOL in this early period. Smaller web-based providers and individual 
users also successfully claimed protection under the statute.240 In Batzel v. 
Smith, an art collector brought defamation and related reputational injury 
claims against a relatively small website and listserv administrator for 
posting third-party allegations about her ownership of Nazi art.241 In 
                                                                                                                         
485, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60699, at *10–14 (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Courts may have had little to say about that provision because Congress did not specify the
sanction that courts may impose on providers that fail to adhere to its terms.  And, yet, we might also 
assume that, had they been inclined to adopt a narrower conception of immunity that hewed more 
closely to the text of Section 230(c), they could have made immunity contingent on fulfilling the duty 
under Section 230(d).
235 See, e.g., Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming the district 
court’s finding that Section 230(c)(2) provided AOL with immunity for protecting its members from 
materials it considered objectionable to its subscribers); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company v. America 
Online, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition 
of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory 
functions.”); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Section 230 was enacted, in 
part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum.”).
236 See, e.g., Green, 318 F.3d at 473; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp at 50.
237 Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983. 
238 Id. at 983, 985.
239 Id. at 986 (discussing Zeran).
240 See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520 (Cal. 2006) (“Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold 
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 
F.3d 1018, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[R]eject[ing] the argument that Mosler’s continued sponsorship of 
the Network after Cremers published Smith’s statements should give rise to liability.”).
241 See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018).  
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Barrett v. Rosenthal, a case decided by the California Supreme Court, 
doctors brought a defamation claim against the user of a consumer 
protection discussion group for impugning their character and 
competence.242 The courts in both cases relied on Section 230 to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ respective claims, explaining in both that the decision to post or 
not to post another user’s content was an act of publishing within the 
meaning of the statute.243 It did not matter that the defendants in each were 
users rather than providers of an interactive computer service.
The preponderance of these early cases involved discrete third-party 
posts of scandalous material about a discrete plaintiff user.244 But many 
did not.  Defendants invoked the immunity against claims for fraud and 
unjust enrichment,245 business-related torts,246 and breach of contract.247
For the most part, however, the courts stayed true to the broad Zeran
reading of Section 230 immunity. Their interpretation accordingly has 
facilitated the proliferation of online applications that depend on 
user-generated content: from social media to massively multiplayer online 
games to crowd-sourced review sites.248
2. Material Contribution
The cases that courts have been asked to resolve in recent years 
                                                                                                                         
242 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529.
243 Id.; Batzel, 333 F.3d. at 1036.  But see Maxfield v. Maxfield, No. FSTCV145014267, 2015 
WL 9809777, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2015) (finding that defendant is not “publisher or 
speaker” when retweeting defamatory material about ex-husband).
244 See generally CTR. ON LAW AND INFO. POLICY AT FORDHAM LAW SCH., SECTION 230 OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENT ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS
(Apr. 25, 2012) (surveying sixteen years of Section 230 cases).
245 See, e.g., Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 WL 5550485, at *1 (D.D.C. 
May 17, 2004) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in case involving nude dancer’s 
claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, and negligence for 
using intimate photos on a pornography website without consent). 
246 See, e.g., Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV788630, 2000 
WL 34016435, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000) (service provider claiming for, inter alia,
intentional interference with contractual relationships, unfair competition, and restraint of trade for 
flagging plaintiffs’ emails as spam).
247 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38–39 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2001) (author bringing 
breach of contract claim for failing to remove negative customer reviews of book).
248 See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s 
granting of Yelp!’s motion to dismiss given Congress’ recognition that internet activity flourishes with 
minimal government regulation); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(affirming district court’s finding that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 shields Zuckerberg 
and Facebook from suit); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552 (N.C. App. 2012) (reversing trial 
court’s decision and holding that online ticket reseller is immune from liability for allowing users to 
resell tickets in its online marketplace even if the user’s actions violated the state’s anti-scalping 
statute).  But see Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), granting review, 
381 P.3d 231 (2016) (affirming trial court injunction on non-party crowd sourced review site to remove 
negative reviews of plaintiff).
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continue to present familiar fact-patterns involving discrete,
reputation-damaging third-party statements.249 But many arise from 
disputes that diverge from the Zeran framework. Indeed, by the 
mid-2000s, defendant providers were no longer simple conduits of the 
AOL variety. They were now designing social networking applications for 
dating and socializing as well as crowdsourced applications for knowledge 
production,250 financing,251 user reviews,252 and traffic monitoring.253
Section 230 doctrine likely helped to fuel this expansion.  That is, while 
the drafters of Section 230 could not have anticipated these emergent
applications or services, they surely heralded their possibility. 
Entrepreneurs, in turn, raced to design and market lucrative services, 
free from the chilling threat of secondary liability. We can assume that 
there was very little that was malevolent in this ambition.  The driving 
ethos for many of these entrepreneurs was to facilitate connections around 
the world.254
But the contours of the Section 230 doctrine would have to adapt. 
Courts would have to recalibrate the Zeran framework to attend to 
immersive and affecting applications that neither Congress nor the Fourth 
Circuit could anticipate. The specific question of how to gauge the extent 
of provider creation and development would become more complicated as 
developers designed applications that automated user-to-user interactions, 
effectively requiring courts to revise the way in which they conceived of 
the online “publisher or speaker” role. 
One of the more instructive cases to take up the challenge was Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com.255 That case 
concerned an ostensibly well-meaning, web-based service that matched 
people looking for a place to live with people offering rooms to rent.256
The defendant’s website consisted of two pertinent features that created a 
great opportunity for the Ninth Circuit to spell out how far courts would be 
willing to allow the immunity under Section 230 to reach.  
                                                                                                                         
249 See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2016).
250 Wikipedia.com is an example of this.
251 Artistshare.com, Indiegogo.com, and Kickstarter.com are examples of crowdsourced 
applications for financing.
252 Yelp.com is such a website.
253 Waze.com is an example of a crowdsourced application for traffic monitoring.
254 See Mark Zuckerberg, Is Connectivity a Human Right?, https://scontent.fijd1-1.fna.fbcdn.net/
v/t39.2365-6/12057105_1001874746531417_622371037_n.pdf?oh=ee304c17ab2509f1a5ba969786
a8372e&oe=59EEE927 (“I’m focused on this because I believe it is one of the greatest challenges of 
our generation.  The unfair economic reality is that those already on Facebook have way more money 
than the rest of the world combined, so it may not actually be profitable for us to serve the next few 
billion people for a very long time, if ever.  But we believe everyone deserves to be connected.”). 
255 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
256 Roommates.com still exists.  But since the case, the website operates a little differently than it 
did ten years ago.
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In order to subscribe to the service as either a room-hunter or offeror, 
Roommates required users to create a profile by choosing from a closed 
universe of biographical facts, including sex, sexual orientation, and 
whether the user has children.257 The service similarly required 
prospective subscribers to convey which of these attributes—sex, sexual 
orientation, and having children—they prefer in roommates.258
Roommates would use these preferences to classify, filter, and pair 
subscribers. Second, the service invited subscribers to provide “Additional 
Comments,” without any direction about what those comments convey.259
Users, as it turned out, used this space in their profile to express 
preferences about prospective roommates’ gender, race, sexual orientation, 
and family status.
Plaintiff, a civil rights group, sued alleging that the Roommates service 
consisted of explicitly eliciting and communicating information about 
prospective renters and lessors in violation of federal and state fair housing 
law.260 The federal FHA flatly bars real estate brokers from eliciting 
information about a prospective renter or buyer’s sex, sexual orientation, or 
family status or indicating a preference for renters or buyers along any of 
those dimensions.261 The fair housing advocates that brought the case 
argued that, by conditioning participation in the service on reporting 
restricted information, Roommates is an information content developer 
within the meaning of the statute, not a passive conduit.262
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed.263 As alleged by plaintiff, 
Roommates’ classifications, filtering, and matching functions, the panel 
concluded, were not immune from liability because Defendant steered 
subscribers based on attributes that are forbidden by federal and state fair 
housing laws.264 To be sure, third-party subscribers selected among the 
listed preferences and, when they did so, were “[ ]other content 
developers” within the meaning of Section 230.265 The court explains that 
this, however, did not preclude Roommates from being one as well.266
                                                                                                                         
257 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1161.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 1162.
261 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
262 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1166.
263 Id. at 1165.
264 Id. at 1169.
265 Id. at 1165.
266 Id. at 1165, 1167 (“[T]he party responsible for putting information online may be subject to 
liability, even if the information originated with a user. . . .  At the same time, reading the exception for 
co-developers as applying only to content that originates entirely with the website . . . ignores the 
words ‘development . . . in part’ in the statutory passage ‘creation or development in whole or in part.’”
(citing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1033 and quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3))). 
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Indeed, these third-party room hunters would not have violated fair 
housing law but for Roommate.com’s design. 
The court was forgiving of the “Additional Comments” feature of the 
website.  Roommates did not contribute any part of what third-party users 
posted.  The “Additional Comments” feature, the court concluded, was 
precisely the sort of user-generated content that Congress sought to 
encourage with Section 230.267 Imposing a duty on services like 
Roommates to police those comments would impose the very burden that 
Congress meant to avoid.  In the end, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case 
back to the trial court to determine whether the drop-down menus that 
Roommates employed to elicit illegal information in fact violated federal 
and state housing laws.268 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the two 
markedly different features of the rooming service delimits how far service 
providers may go before losing immunity under the statute.  
Roommates is today one of the most cited authorities for the material 
contribution standard under Section 230. This is chiefly because the court 
went beyond the Zeran framework in its immunity analysis.  It did not 
confine itself to the question of whether the defendant provider developed 
objectionable content that originates with a discrete, reputation-damaging 
post by a third party.269 The court in Roommates held that the immunity 
may apply in the absence of a discrete harm to plaintiff.270
Based on this approach, search engines are immune from liability 
when they index websites that make unauthorized ringtones available to 
users;271 consumer advocacy websites are immune from liability for 
soliciting, advertising, and claiming exclusive copyright ownership of 
                                                                                                                         
267 Id. at 1174.
268 Id. at 1175.  On remand, the district court found that Roommates.com did not violate fair 
housing laws.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1219 
(9th Cir. 2012).
269 Some federal courts have entertained a less demanding “encouragement test.” See, e.g., Doe v. 
Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412, 420 
(6th Cir. 2008) (“[The Court should ask] whether the claim is directed toward the defendant in its 
publishing, editorial, and/or screening capacities, and seeking to hold it ‘liable for its publication of 
third-party content or harms flowing from the dissemination of that content.’”). But the prevailing rule 
requires plaintiffs to allege or prove that the defendant materially contributed the essential elements of 
the illicit content.  Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014).  The Sixth Circuit has 
explained that the encouragement test would chill sites from entertaining user reviews or comments.  
Id. at 414–15.  Congress, the Sixth Circuit explained, envisioned a far more “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open internet” than the encouragement rule would allow.  Id. at 415.
270 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1174.
271 See Manchanda v. Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft Bing, 16 CV-3350, 2016 WL 6806250 at *2, 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Manchanda has not shown that Defendants’ allegedly injurious conduct here—
namely, their aggregation and indexing of websites in their capacity as search engines—satisfies this 
high standard of outrageousness.”); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (finding Google’s use of its AdWords program acceptable under the immunity principle).
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negative reviews of attorneys;272 and employers are immune for the 
defamatory statements that their employees post.273 In all of these 
instances, the courts have employed a generous protection from liability 
that requires plaintiffs to establish that the defendant intermediary 
materially contributed to the creation or development of illegal or illicit 
material.  
The Roommates opinion, however, also opened the door to liability for 
intermediary design. It held, after all, that immunity may be inapplicable 
when the defendant provider violates a law by virtue of its design, 
unrelated to whether plaintiff has experienced a discrete injury.274 It was 
enough that the plaintiff civil rights organization stood in for the public to 
articulate the injury under the fair housing laws.  We have yet to see how 
far this aspect of the holding will go. I will return to this below, in Parts III 
and IV.
Indeed, the protection under Section 230 remains robust. But all is not 
lost to plaintiffs.  As protective of intermediaries as courts have been, they 
also have held that duties to users (and all others) remain if they do not 
arise from the “publishing” event, but rather from some separate or 
intervening condition.275 So, an unfulfilled promise from Yahoo to take 
down defamatory third-party posts creates the duty to do so if the promisee 
relied on Yahoo’s representations.276 Model Mayhem, a company that 
administers an online marketplace for models to advertise themselves to 
agencies and advertising firms, is not immune from liability for failing to 
warn users about two men it knows have used its website to lure women to 
offline locations where the men sexually assault them.277 Airbnb does not 
have a Section 230 defense and may be liable for failing to verify that hosts 
have registered with San Francisco as lessors of their short-term rental 
units.278 A marketing network that places clients’ advertisements on 
affiliated “fake news” sites was not immune for publishing the deceptive
product information in the advertisements.279 Google is not immune under 
                                                                                                                         
272 See Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190, 200 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(finding Xcentric Ventures LLC’s activities to be in accordance with the immunity principle).
273 Davis v. Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C., No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL 1535694, at *1–2, *5 
(Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2015), appellate review denied (June 19, 2015).
274 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1174–75.
275 See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he CDA does 
not provide a general immunity against all claims derived from third-party content.”); Barnes v. Yahoo, 
570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that there are some actions that the statute does not 
shield from immunity); Airbnb v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1075 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (“Requirements that might have an incidental ripple effect on Internet postings are 
not barred under the CDA.”).
276 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.
277 Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853–54.
278 Airbnb, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1070, 1076.
279 Leadclick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 168.
2018] INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES 255
Section 230 from District of Columbia consumer protection statutory 
claims because it removed the video in violation of its own terms of 
service.280
There is nothing particularly remarkable in this nuance, however.  The 
only notable take-away from this emergent line of cases is that courts 
appear to be becoming far more attentive to the way in which plaintiffs 
seek remedies for the “publishing” event. The broad scope of protection 
from liability for bad acts that originate with third-party users is 
unchanged.
3. Whither the Good Samaritan
Courts rarely if ever draw on the biblical parable for which Section 
230(c) immunity is conspicuously named. This is not that surprising, 
since, alone, a statute’s heading is generally not dispositive, particularly if 
courts believe that it conflicts with the gist of the statutory text.281 Nor, 
moreover, are religion or religious teachings supposed to supplant the hard 
work of statutory interpretation in our constitutional democracy.282 Yet, a 
statute’s title or headers may be useful when the meaning of a statutory 
provision is not clear,283 because they “supply cues” about the legislature’s 
intentions.284 Accordingly, I offer here a word about the biblical reference.
The main scriptural account starts with a man that has been robbed, 
beaten, and left for dead on the side of a major commercial road.285 Two 
passersby, a priest and a Levite, walk by in turn.286 They each see the 
victim on the verge of dying but do nothing to help, consistent with 
interpretations of religious law that forbid defiling a corpse and avoiding 
uncleanliness.287 A third passerby, a Samaritan, tends to the man’s 
wounds, carries him on his donkey to a nearby inn, and pays the innkeeper 
for every day that the victim stays to recover.288
On its plain terms, the parable is jarringly dissonant with life online 
today, where service providers host misogynist attacks on celebrities and 
mendaciously defamatory tweets from the President of the United States. 
But if the caption and language of Section 230(c)(2)(A) is to be taken 
                                                                                                                         
280 Song Fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
281 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015).
282 But see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1892).
283 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233 (1998) (“‘[T]he title of a statute and 
the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a 
statute.” (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947))); see also
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083 (“While these headings are not commanding, they supply cues.”); Holy 
Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 463 (“[Light is thrown upon the statute by the language of the title.”).
284 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083.
285 Luke 10:25–37.
286 Id.
287 GEZA VERMES, THE AUTHENTIC GOSPEL OF JESUS 152–54 (2004). 
288 Luke 10:25–37. 
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seriously, Congress sought to entreat people to attend to vulnerable online 
users in spite of popular injunctions against doing so.289
It is beyond dispute that today’s online intermediary immunity doctrine 
does not encourage providers or users of interactive computer services to 
follow in the footsteps of our biblical hero. Section 230 has been invoked 
successfully by extremely unsympathetic defendants.290 In light of 
monitoring costs, moreover, service providers have every incentive to be 
agnostic about the harmful effects that their users’ communications may 
have on others, including and especially the most vulnerable and 
disempowered. 
Putting aside the interesting question of whether governments are or 
should be in the business of inspiring good works,291 after two decades of 
litigation, the courts have developed an immunity doctrine that turns the 
statute’s titular objective upside down.  They have held that Section 230’s 
reach is not confined to reputational harms or content that is harmful to 
children,292 the only categories of conduct to which the statute refers.  The 
consensus rule today is that Section 230(c) immunizes all providers from 
liability for all tortious third-party user content to the extent they do not 
materially contribute to its creation or development.  
More to the point, the courts have held that the immunity is not 
contingent on monitoring or voluntarily taking good-faith steps to screen or 
take down illicit content as the statute suggests.  If it were, the courts have 
explained, the doctrine would divert resources to policing content and 
away from the development of new services. Instead, some courts have 
explained that Section 230(c)(2)(A) provides an alternative protection for 
service providers who take good-faith steps voluntarily to screen or remove 
objectionable content.293 That protection is distinct from the broader 
                                                                                                                         
289 DOUGLAS A. HICKS & MARK VALERI, GLOBAL NEIGHBORS: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL 
OBLIGATION IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 31 (2008) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., A Time to Break 
Silence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 231 (James M. Washington ed., 1991)).
290 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding website that enables 
users to anonymously post comments, photographs, and videos immune from liability under Section 
230); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16, 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 
(2017) (finding website that provides online classified advertising immune under Section 230).
291 Tax law presents this question quite directly.
292 But see Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137–38 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he 
Court concludes that the ‘good samaritan’ immunity is inapplicable where Yahoo! did not engage in 
any form of content analysis of the subject text to identify material that was offensive or harmful prior 
to the automatic sending of a notification message.”).
293 See Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Section 230(c)(2) 
“provides an additional shield from liability” for services that take good step measures to remove or 
restrict access to objectionable content).  See, e.g., Motiva Enterprises, No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL 
1535694 at *2 (explaining that Section 230(c)(2) shields defendant-employer from liability for good-
faith efforts to restrict employee-users from posting defamatory material online); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
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protection under Section 230(c)(1), which covers all providers that act as a 
“publisher or speaker,” as long as they do not have a hand in “creating or 
developing” the objectionable content.294
This is to say that courts do not read Section 230(c) as doing what its 
title purports.  In a rich irony, the statute now protects the apathetic service 
provider as much as the do-gooder, which is to say there is no incentive in 
law to be a Good Samaritan service provider. To invoke the language of 
economics, the doctrine has introduced “moral hazard.”295
As I suggest in Part II above,296 this broad protection is not the most 
straightforward way of making sense of Section 230(c), particularly in 
light of the teachings of the parable on which the title is based.  But, with 
only a few notable exceptions, the courts have been uninterested in the 
point.  The Zeran panel, for example, did not identify which provision of 
Section 230—(c)(1) or (c)(2)(A)—it relied on to reach its conclusion.  This 
is not to say that it did not consider alternative forms of the immunity.  The 
court there recognized that Congress sought to encourage self-regulation, a 
purpose that speaks directly to Section 230(c)(2)(A), and not necessarily 
Section 230(c)(1).  But the court did so without explicit reference to those 
provisions.  And it also drew a different conclusion: that the best way to 
encourage self-regulation was to immunize providers that are slow or even
indifferent to user injury.  Even more, other courts have written out the 
distinction between active and passive users of “an interactive computer 
service” under the statute, effectively equating those services that “actively 
post or republish information” and those that remove or simply do not 
publish objectionable content.297
But there was another way. Read closely, Section 230(c)(2)(A), as 
specific and relatively conditional as it is, resembles an operative 
provision, where Section 230(c)(1) blankly speaks of how to “treat” 
“publisher[s] or speaker[s],” without specific mention of the circumstances 
                                                                                                                         
Section 230(c)(2) protects service provider from any claims “seek[ing] to hold MySpace liable for 
ineffective security measures and/or policies relating to age verification”).
294 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105, 1107.
295 Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-on-stilts-zerans-legacy/
(“[T]here is no evidence that broad immunity from liability has done anything more than encourage 
websites and ISPs to be increasingly reckless with regard to abusive and unlawful content on their 
platforms.”)
296 See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing what constitutes creation and development under Section 
230(f)(3)).
297 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527–28 (“A user who actively selects and posts 
material based on its content fits well within the traditional role of ‘publisher.’”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 
F.3d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the publisher 
approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or 
degree, not substance.”). 
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under which such an entity may be immune from liability.298 Read in this 
way, Section (c)(1) only delimits the category of covered “providers or 
users of an interactive computer service.” Section 230(c)(2)(A), on the 
other hand, is not so sweeping.  It, rather, declares the conditions under 
which courts may not hold a Good Samaritan service provider liable, 
effectively encouraging such providers to take good-faith actions 
voluntarily to screen objectionable content. This reading of Section 230(c) 
would only apply the immunity when safe harbor conditions under 
(c)(2)(A) are met in the way that the title of Section 230(c) and parts of the 
legislative history suggest.299 The canon of interpretation that privileges 
specific provisions over general ones supports this common-sense 
approach.300
Some courts have acknowledged that this is a plausible reading, but 
nevertheless declined to abide by it.301 Thus, today, the practical effect of 
the current doctrine is to dissuade services from helping to protect users 
from attack. There is now nothing to be gained under law for application 
developers to be Good Samaritans online.
III. DESIGNS BEYOND IMMUNITY
I have shown above in Part II that, while courts have not completely 
foreclosed relief to plaintiffs, current doctrine substantially limits the 
parties from which they may recover. A plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant’s service or application “materially contributes” to third-party 
users’ volitional online conduct. In practice, the doctrine makes legal 
challenges to intermediaries’ designs especially difficult to win.
Recent developments, however, suggest that the tide may be turning. 
Popular intermediaries today do not resemble the publishers that Congress 
envisioned when it enacted Section 230.  As I explained in Part I above, 
the most popular intermediaries today engineer almost every aspect of 
users’ online experience. Courts may in this regard no longer presume that 
the underlying injury originates with a third-party user’s objectionable 
volitional act.  They may come to recognize that service providers’ design 
                                                                                                                         
298 Cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that there are multiple 
ways to read Section 230(c)(1)) (Easterbrook, J.).
299 Accord Sherman v. Yahoo, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
300 See, e.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957) 
(explaining that “[s]pecific terms [in a statute] prevail over general” terms in a conflicting statute); 
Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 1991) (explaining that when 
general and specific terms conflict, the latter prevails).  
301 GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; see also Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[I]f section (c) did provide equal protection, then ‘[internet service providers] may be expected to 
take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity’ because ‘precautions are costly.’” (citing GTE Corp., 
347 F.3d at 660)). 
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of the choice architecture precipitate illegal expressive acts. The 
Roommates formulation in particular opens up the possibility that courts 
will attend to the design conditions under which illicit conduct may occur.  
A. Structuring User Content 
As I explained above, Roommates is the leading case on the material 
contribution standard.  But the Ninth Circuit’s opinion there also sheds 
light on whether and how a developer’s application design might be so 
affecting or assertive as to count as “development” under Section 230. The 
en banc court there held that Roommates could not be immune for illegal 
third-party content that it elicited.302 Its designers structured the 
Roommates website to require subscribers to express preferences for 
gender, sexual orientation, and family size in violation of fair housing 
laws.303 Users had no hand in selecting those listed items.304 They had to 
choose among those options in order to subscribe.305 The Ninth Circuit 
held that this feature of the website implicated Roommates in FHA 
violations every time someone used it to find a roommate.306 The court 
held that the open “Additional Comments” online form, on the other hand, 
did not consign user responses in the same way and, therefore, did not 
implicate Roommates in the development of third-party user content.307
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Roommates relied heavily on Carafano,
decided five years before.  That older opinion helps to explain the 
“material contribution” test and elaborates the later opinion’s application to 
intermediary design.308 There, an anonymous user created a false profile of 
the plaintiff on Matchmaker.com, a dating site operated by Metrosplash. 
Matchmaker required its participating members to reveal personal 
information through a questionnaire that contained over 50 multiple-choice 
questions and several open-ended questions.309 The multiple-choice 
questions asked for such things as users’ respective age, physical 
characteristics, interests, personality, and reasons for joining the service.310
The open-ended questions invited users to submit whatever information or 
photos they thought were relevant to finding a mate, as long as it did not 
include risqué images or personally identifiable information like last name, 
                                                                                                                         
302 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
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309 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
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home or email address, or phone number.311 Matchmaker did not review 
each profile to ensure compliance.312
As in Zeran, nothing on the Matchmaker site could altogether bar 
anonymous users from impersonating someone else.  That is how, in 
Carafano, an anonymous user based in Berlin created a false profile of the 
plaintiff, a relatively well-known California-based movie and television 
actress.313 While he did not identify Carafano by her real or stage name, he 
still managed to suggest her identity by posting publicly available pictures 
and identifying two popular movies in which she was featured.314 His 
answers to the multiple-choice questions were sexually descriptive and 
aggressive.315 He also included an email address through which he set up 
an automatic reply that identified Carafano’s real home address and phone 
number.316
Within days, Carafano was receiving phone calls, voice messages, 
email, mail, and faxes.317 Several of the people who contacted her 
expressed concern that she might post such a profile online.318 Most 
others, however, expressed genuine interest in meeting.319 A few other 
messages were sexually explicit.320 And a handful threatened physical 
harm to Carafano and her son.321 The Matchmaker administrators deleted 
the false profiles days after Carafano’s publicist contacted them.322 But, of 
course, the damage had already been done. Carafano soon sued against 
Metrosplash, alleging invasion of privacy, misappropriation of the right of 
publicity, defamation, and negligence.323
The Ninth Circuit held that Matchmaker could not be held liable for 
the false Carafano profile because, even if the questionnaire elicited some 
of the illegal content, the anonymous third-party user, not Matchmaker, 
provided the “essential published content.”324 It did not matter, the court 
explained, that Matchmaker “facilitated the expression of information” or 
engaged in “specific editing or selection” in defining discrete categories or 
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sorting users’ answers.325 “[T]he selection of the content was left 
exclusively to the user.”326
The Ninth Circuit did not explain what it meant by “essential,” but, as 
used there, the court foreshadowed the material contribution standard that 
it would later announce in Roommates.  In Carafano, the panel 
acknowledged that the Matchmaker service made the illegal 
communication possible but, at the same time, determined that the 
company did not have a legally significant role in developing its 
“essential” elements.  “Matchmaker cannot be considered an ‘information 
content provider’ under the statute,” the panel explained, because the 
service only “structure[d] the information provided by users” in order to 
match them.327
The Roommates court relied heavily on its holding in Carafano.  In 
that earlier case, the en banc Ninth Circuit explained, the content at issue 
was “created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, without 
prompting or help from the website operator.”328 In Roommates, however, 
the company developed “the discriminatory questions, discriminatory 
answers, and discriminatory search mechanism” before any new 
subscribers even expressed their preferences.329 Roommates, moreover, 
“ma[de] aggressive use” of the content that it elicits from users “in 
conducting its business.”330
The difference between contributions for which an intermediary may 
be liable and those for which it may not turns on how “essential” the 
intermediary is to the development of the illegal online conduct.331 The 
immunity under this framing is not contingent on whether a third party 
provides the content.  Nor does it depend on whether the provider’s 
contribution is additive.  After Roommates, the immunity may turn on the 
way in which the intermediary structures its service or application to 
receive and uses third-party material.  This approach takes seriously the 
statute’s assertion that service providers lose their immunity if they are 
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information.”332
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B. Design as Knowledge 
Missing from the discussion here (and the doctrine) has been any 
serious consideration of how much a defendant provider must know about 
the likelihood of harm to lose the immunity.  We might understand the 
Roommates opinion to suggest that a provider cannot be immune when it 
has knowingly designed its service or application in order to elicit illegal 
third-party content.  After all, Roommates deliberately designed its site so 
that all of its users had to choose between its prepopulated drop-down 
menu options.333 As with most website developers, the company was 
probably very attentive to the substantive preference options from which it 
allowed users to choose, as well as the way it presented the choices for 
selection (i.e., choice architecture).  
But the Roommates court did not frame its opinion in this way. Nor 
did it have to.  After Zeran, subjective provider knowledge of user 
wrongdoing has no part in the current doctrine.334 Two other cases help to 
explain: Doe v. Myspace and Batzel v. Smith.
1. Subjective Knowledge about the Likelihood of Harm to Plaintiff
In Doe v. MySpace, the defendant provider operated (and still operates) 
a social networking site that requires users to create profiles with a name, 
an email address, gender, country, and date of birth.335 Users may also 
post photographs, videos, and any other information that they want to share 
with the public or, if they prefer, their circle of MySpace friends.336 Users 
who were over age sixteen could limit which aspects of their profile could 
be seen by others.337 MySpace, however, automatically rendered the
profiles of users who are under sixteen private.338 The service also 
developed software to ferret out teenagers who claimed to be older than 
they were, but this feature was far from foolproof since about 22 percent of 
its users were minors, and a large percentage of these users claimed to be 
older than they really were.339
Like many of her peers, Julie falsely represented that she was eighteen 
years old when she created her MySpace profile.340 And she chose not to 
                                                                                                                         
333 That Roommates did not include racial categories among its prepopulated drop-down menu 
suggests an unstated recognition on this point.  It may be that they thought that such categories would 
be illegal, if not simply alarming.
334 See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his theory of liability is 
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block access to her information.341 Her personal information was therefore 
viewable by all MySpace users.  It was under these conditions that Julie 
and a nineteen-year old man exchanged contact information.342 The two 
eventually met in person and, there, at their first encounter, the older man 
sexually assaulted her.343 Soon after, Julie and her mother brought a 
handful of tort claims against MySpace, including claims for negligence 
and gross negligence for failing to implement basic safety measures to 
protect minors from predators.344 They argued that the physical sexual 
assault arose out of the connection Julie made by virtue of MySpace’s 
questionnaire.  The Does argued that the immunity provisions were 
inapplicable because MySpace was “partially responsible for creating the 
content” that brought Julie, a minor, in contact with her attacker.345
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the Doe’s claims.346 The plaintiffs, the panel explained, were 
suing MySpace for publishing information for which Julie was wholly 
responsible.347 She had done so in spite of MySpace’s rule against such 
misrepresentations.  Imposing liability on MySpace for the distribution of 
this content, the panel determined, was exactly what Congress wanted to 
block.348
MySpace’s design was in no small part born from the broad 
interpretation of Section 230 immunity that the courts had developed in the 
decade before.  The company curated the information that users shared 
with others.  And it did so knowing that over a fifth of its users were 
minors and that many of these, in turn, misrepresented their age.  This is to 
say that the company actively courted children, knowing that many of them 
would misrepresent their age.  
One might assume that a statute addressed to protecting children from 
objectionable online content would not immunize websites that knowingly 
expose children to danger.  But, for the Fifth Circuit, that consideration 
hardly made an appearance in the opinion.  For the panel, plaintiffs had to 
be far more engaged in the underlying tort—perhaps by explicitly eliciting 
an incorrect age or encouraging a sexual encounter between underage Julie 
and her adult assailant.349 Without such allegations, the court determined 
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that MySpace owed no obligation to implement any further safety 
measures to bar minors from interacting with adults, even as it knew that a 
meaningful number of the children who used the application were 
vulnerable.  
This approach is quite unlike the way in which courts analyze the 
scope of liability in cases involving claims that a defendant intermediary 
has generalizable or specific subjective knowledge that its service or 
product facilitates copyright violations.350 Pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, the 1998 amendment to the Copyright Act, a 
provider is obliged to remove infringing material when it has “actual 
knowledge” of it on its site or is “aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.”351 Under Section 230, on the other 
hand, services like MySpace are shielded from liability for publishing 
users’ information even though its administrators understood with a 
relatively high degree of confidence that minors were misrepresenting their 
ages on the site and that, by doing so, those children were making 
themselves vulnerable to attack.  The company’s policy of automatically 
protecting the privacy of users under the age of sixteen betrays its 
knowledge of the risks.  But its awareness of wrongdoing was not salient 
enough to sway the court against MySpace. For the panel, the social media 
company owed no duty to attend to patterns of deception (on the part of 
children) and abuse (on the part of adults), no matter how pernicious or 
predictable.
There is at least one sliver of hope for plaintiffs set on premising their 
theory of service provider liability on the provider’s subjective knowledge 
of third-party wrongdoing.  One year after the decision in Roommates, in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit suggested that 
a defendant-provider’s knowledge may indeed be important to
understanding the materiality of its contribution to illegal third-party 
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content.352 Importantly, there, the defendant’s knowledge was evidenced 
by the systems it put in place to generate third-party content.  In this case,
the defendant operated a website that sold personal information about 
individuals, including telephone records.353 Users of Accusearch’s service 
paid an “administrative search fee” to obtain public and private 
information about people.354 The company, in turn, contracted with third-
party researchers to retrieve the sought information “in accordance with 
applicable law.”355 Once retrieved and formatted, Accusearch delivered 
the information to the requesting customer’s online account.356 The 
Federal Trade Commission sued, alleging, among other things, that 
Accusearch committed an unfair trade practice under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act whenever it obtained and made confidential customer 
telephone records publicly available.357 Accusearch moved for summary 
judgment on Section 230 grounds.358
The question for the Tenth Circuit panel was whether Accusearch 
created or developed the confidential telephone information under Section 
230(f)(3) by engaging researchers to retrieve it.359 The court answered that 
Accusearch did and, therefore, was ineligible for immunity.360 The term 
“development,” it explained, should be read to encompass “the act of 
drawing something out, making it visible, active, or usable.”361 The term 
“responsible” under Section 230, it continued, suggests that the provider is 
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“more than a neutral conduit for . . . content.”362 Section 230 would not 
allow courts to impose liability on a service provider in the same way that 
a highway builder could not be responsible for a banker’s escape.363 Thus, 
under the statute, the panel concluded, “a service provider is responsible 
for the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically 
encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”364
This, the Tenth Circuit concluded, is what Accusearch did when it 
routinely contracted with third-party researchers to retrieve customer 
information it knew to be illegal.  Unlike Ben Ezra, where defendant AOL 
solicited information that happened to be inaccurate, Accusearch 
knowingly sought to obtain confidential consumer information in order to 
share it with the public.365 Accusearch’s solicitation and collection of 
private customer information, the court observed, was its reason for 
being.366
This, recall, was similar to Roommates’ failing.  The real estate search 
service there required third-party users to provide illegal responses to 
illegal questions in order to participate.  Connecting users based on the 
restricted demographic information that Roommates elicited and sorted 
was the application’s reason for being.  To be sure, the (restricted) 
dimensions on which Roommates relied to facilitate reliably strong 
matches were salient.  But that is precisely why Congress forbade their 
consideration.  The Ninth Circuit held that, no matter how valuable 
information about a prospective roommate’s gender or sexual orientation 
might be, it is illegal to traffic in it when looking for a roommate.367
Eliciting that information harms disfavored groups in exactly the ways the 
fair housing laws forbid.  
In this way, it may be that the potential violation in Roommates was far 
worse than that in Accusearch, because, unlike the latter, every third-party 
response in the former was illegal.  And, more to the point here, 
Roommates designed its application in order to collect and publish the 
illegal information.  To the extent Accusearch was implicated in the 
development of illegal content, it was because the company paid 
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researchers to obtain information it knew to be illegal.368 But those 
violations occurred only when a subscriber sought that kind of personal 
information.369
2. Objective Knowledge about Third-Party User Intent
This is not to say that courts do not consider a service provider’s 
knowledge of wrongdoing to determine the applicability of Section 230 
immunity.  The Ninth Circuit did in at least one case early in the statute’s 
life.  In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant provider’s 
knowledge was pertinent to determining whether the third party “provided” 
the content at issue for publication.  “Publishing,” it held, could only occur 
if the provider reasonably believes that it was the third-party user’s 
intention to have the material published.370 The opposite rule, the court 
explained, would confer “nearly limitless immunity for speech never meant 
to be broadcast over the Internet,”371 and accordingly work against Section 
230’s objective to encourage providers “to remove offensive material.”372
To shield the defendant in that case from liability, the panel observed, 
would have the opposite effect; it would protect providers who attribute 
objectionable content to unwitting third parties.373
The third party in that case, Robert Smith, was a building contractor 
who had reason to believe that one of his clients, plaintiff Ellen Batzel, 
inherited paintings that had been illegally stolen by the Nazis in the years 
before World War II.374 Smith sent an email message that conveyed his 
suspicions to an email address that he found online for the Museum 
Security Network, an online network devoted the retrieval of stolen art.375
The recipient of the email, Ton Cremers, immediately forwarded Smith’s 
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email to the Network’s affiliated listserv and also posted it on the website 
after making minor edits.376 Trial discovery suggested that Smith did not 
know that his email would be forwarded to the Network’s international 
email address list.377
Her reputation tarnished, plaintiff sued Smith, Cremers, and others for 
defamation.378 She argued that she was not related to Nazis and that the art 
was not looted Nazi art.379 Cremers answered that, among other things, he 
could not be held liable for posting Smiths’ defamatory statements on the 
website because he is a publisher that “did no more than select and make 
minor alterations to Smith’s email.”380
The panel sided with Cremers.381 And, in this regard, Batzel ratified 
the emergent view then in 2003 that providers of interactive computer 
services would find a generous protection under Section 230(c) to publish 
illegal third-party content without concern about liability.382 But, far more 
pertinently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for more 
fact-finding on whether a reasonable provider could believe that Smith 
intended to the have the contents of his email message forwarded or 
published to the Network’s listserv.383 This is to say that the court did not 
remand the case to the district court to inquire into Cremers’ subjective 
impressions of Smith’s intentions. Section 230 makes no provision for that 
kind of consideration.  Nor was the lower court to concern itself with 
whether Cremers meant to do harm by publishing the contents of Smith’s 
email.  The panel’s opinion disposed of that question.  Rather, the Ninth 
Circuit charged the trial court with the task of determining whether, 
objectively, a provider or user of an interactive computer service could 
reasonably believe that Smith wanted him to publish the contents of the 
email.
Since Batzel, courts do not bother to inquire into providers’ subjective 
knowledge of or intention to publish illegal content.  Nor, after MySpace,
does the doctrine consider intermediaries’ knowledge of the likelihood of 
wrongdoing pertinent to the immunity analysis.  The doctrine is simply not 
concerned with providers’ subjective intentions, in spite of the language in 
Section 230(c)(2) addressed to “good faith.”  
The Batzel panel, however, did think it important to recognize that 
intermediaries are obliged to heed the intentions of third-party users.  At a 
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minimum, this elaboration allows that an intermediary may be liable if it is 
unreasonable in its assessment of whether a third-party user sought to 
publish content.  Sometimes circumstances surrounding providers’ 
acquisition of third-party content are sufficiently unclear as to counsel 
against immunity for publishing that content.  This is a far cry from the 
kind of subjective knowledge that courts consider in cases involving 
publishing torts in other settings.384 But, in any event, this elaboration in 
the doctrine offers something of an opening into provider decision-making 
processes.  It requires that intermediaries be reasonable in their editorial 
decision to publish third-party content.  They may not veer away from or 
be inattentive to the expectations of their users.  This elaboration could 
have purchase in an online information ecosystem in which users share 
information to providers that is later used by that provider in some 
ancillary or unrelated secondary market.  I turn to this point in the next and 
final Part of the Article.
IV. DESIGN DUTIES: REIMAGINING IMMUNITY
A. Designs on Ancillary or Secondary Markets 
Courts have interpreted Section 230 broadly. They do not consider the 
voluntary good-faith efforts of defendant providers, in spite of the 
evocative Good Samaritan language in the statute. Nor do they inquire 
into providers’ subjective knowledge or control of third-party wrongdoing, 
as they do under traditional intermediary-liability rules.385 Courts today 
are reluctant to impose liability on online intermediaries in the name of 
preserving the generative ethos of openness and innovation.  
This laissez-faire approach made sense in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, when service providers offered themselves as little more than the 
conduits through which content flowed between users. Today, however, 
the most popular intermediaries only “publish” a fraction of the 
information that users “provide” in the way that those users intended.
Intermediaries instead collect, analyze, collate, and reconfigure the content 
for markets from which those original users gain no material direct benefit.  
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This must complicate the immunity analysis because the practice of 
trading in user data—that is, after the analysis and sorting—does not fit 
easily within the scope of Section 230. First, the behind-the-scenes “block 
box” algorithmic processing on which intermediaries depend ostensibly 
produces new content that they then make available to other parties in 
ancillary and secondary markets. Providers like these do not resemble the 
traditional conduits envisioned by the framers of Section 230.  Nor do the 
ways in which these intermediaries later make user data available in 
ancillary or secondary markets look anything like the publishing events 
envisioned in the doctrine. Nor, of course, do they involve the 
communication of “objectionable” “material” as was meant by Congress in 
1996.
To the extent there is anything troubling in the administration of users’ 
content on social media and online marketplaces, it is in the way in which 
providers “publish” or, rather, repurpose and exploit users’ content.  And 
the current Section 230 doctrine does not allow courts to account for it.386
As I have shown here, however, application designs implicate 
intermediaries in the creation and development of user content in each 
instance.  Some applications, like Reddit and Twitter, for example, allow 
their users to use pseudonyms.  This has the effect of instilling in users a 
sense that no issue or topic, no matter how unlawful or objectionable, is 
taboo.  Others, like Amazon or Tinder, are more engaged, acting as online 
concierges and curators; they make recommendations about products and 
potential partners based on each users’ idiosyncratic interests and desires.  
And still others, like Netflix or Facebook, sort and monetize their users’ 
data in ancillary or secondary markets.  Indeed, intermediaries in this third 
category are involved in a two-sided business: one that collects user 
information by dint of their ostensible role as a conduit of communication 
and another that markets user data to advertising networks and data 
brokers.387 A final fourth category of intermediaries surreptitiously designs 
their applications with the purpose of directing user behavior. Consider the 
admittedly extreme example of Uber, the ride-hailing smartphone app, that 
has surreptitiously employed a variety of deceptive techniques to 
manipulate drivers and dupe regulators.388
                                                                                                                         
386 See supra Part I (explaining 47 U.S.C. § 230).
387 See NICK SRNICEK, PLATFORM CAPITALISM (2016); see also Alan Z. Rozenshtein, 
Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2935321 (“Surveillance intermediaries also sometimes enable the 
government’s surveillance capabilities, whether by serving as ‘fourth-party’ data brokers that purchase, 
package and resell user data, or by providing infrastructure and technology . . . .”).
388 See Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-
precipice.html (discussing how Uber added a “de Blasio” tab in its app to show lengthy wait times 
when Mayor Bill de Blasio attempted to limit the number of Uber cars); Noam Sheiber, How Uber 
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It is clear then that, today, the information that users share does not 
necessarily flow untouched through providers’ servers, from user to user.  
And it is not “published” in the way Section 230 contemplates. The 
manner in which applications marshal user information varies greatly.  The 
most commercially successful online companies today design their services 
to collect as much user information as possible.  They elicit, structure, sort, 
and sometimes market and sell the user data they receive.  Mindful of its 
value, moreover, these intermediaries employ clever techniques that keep 
users coming back to give more.389 In this way, application developers 
may be far more involved in generating user content and online behavior 
than the Zeran framework contemplates.  At best, these services only 
pretend to be passive platforms that facilitate user interactions.
Many, if not most intermediaries today are more implicated than courts 
believed them to be just a decade ago.  In Roommates, the defendant 
service there required subscribers to provide certain information to 
facilitate salient user-to-user connections.  The company may have had 
other uses for the data it collected, but this possibility did not matter much 
for the court’s purposes.  (The question did not make an appearance in the 
opinions below or on appeal in that case.) At most, the Ninth Circuit in 
Roommates casually observed that the defendant service “ma[d]e 
aggressive use of [user data] in conducting its business,” without 
explaining what “aggressive use” meant.390 Today, in contrast, service 
providers structure and elicit user content in far more assertive if 
innocuous ways.  We might wonder whether this, too, might count as 
making “aggressive use” of content—that is, whether assertive designs 
                                                                                                                         
Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html
(detailing how the company exploits people’s tendencies, such as the one to set earnings goals by 
alerting them that they are “ever so close” to hitting a precious target when they try to log off).  This is 
in sharp contrast to the transparent way in which some online marketplaces own up to their obligations 
to their agents and employees.  See Editorial Board, The Gig Economy’s False Promise, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/the-gig-economys-false-promise.html?
nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share (“Uber and other companies use tactics developed by the 
video game industry to keep drivers on the road when they would prefer to call it a day, raising 
company revenue while lowering drivers’ per-hour earnings.”).
389 See John Herrman, Platform Companies Are Becoming More Powerful – but What Exactly Do 
They Want?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/magazine/platform-
companies-are-becoming-more-powerful-but-what-exactly-do-they-want.html?_r=0 (“With a rigidly 
structured platform like Uber, for which the company sets prices, the economic problems are somewhat 
akin to those of a command economy: How low can we push the cost of a ride before drivers stop 
participating?”).  
390 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 
2008) (emphasis added).
272 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
might count as “material contribution” under the doctrine.391
The immunity may also be inapplicable if the defendant intermediary 
designs its service in order to profit from user content through some other 
service.  Thus, while Section 230 might require a court to dismiss a suit in 
which plaintiff alleges that a service provider’s “Terms of Use” give the 
provider an ownership interest in a third party’s content,392 the immunity 
could very well be unavailable if the service designs its application in order 
to collect particular kinds of illicit information that, through algorithmic 
analysis and sorting, it then repurposes in an ancillary or secondary market.  
In these arrangements, it is a stretch to refer to this manipulation and 
exploitation of user content as “publishing” within the meaning of the 
statute.  
The rule in Batzel that providers attend to whether the third-party user 
at issue intended to have his or her content published is helpful in puzzling 
through the question.  A court in the Northern District of California, for 
example, rejected Facebook’s Section 230 defense in a case in which users 
alleged that the social media company misappropriated their names, 
likenesses, and “likes” for targeted commercial endorsements without their 
consent.393 Facebook, the district court in that case explained, grouped 
plaintiffs’ information with advertisers logos, “transform[ing] the character 
of Plaintiffs’ words, photographs, and actions into a commercial 
endorsement to which they did not consent.”394
This returns us to the example of Facebook’s advertising service.  
Recall that, there, Facebook enables users to craft microtargeted 
advertising campaigns to exclude or include prospective audiences on a 
variety of dimensions, including by “ethnic” or “multicultural affinities.” 
These categories would be uncontroversial but for federal and state laws 
that prohibit the use of race or ethnicity (and proxies for those attributes) to 
discriminate against buyers or sellers in the housing and employment 
market.  The same laws bar advertisements that discriminate on those 
bases.  
The pertinent question is whether Facebook is immune from liability 
under Section 230 for discriminatory advertising campaigns that target or 
exclude people with ethnic or multicultural affinities.  There would be little 
                                                                                                                         
391 I do not take up here the point that the source code “controls” the development of user content. 
See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (detailing how Apple controls 
which apps are available on the App Store).
392 See, e.g., Small Justice v. XCentric Ventures, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(concluding that the transfer of copyright ownership is valid when the user is on inquiry notice of the 
terms and conditions); Facebook v. Finkel, No. 102578, 2009 WL 3240365, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 15, 
2009) (holding that the argument that Facebook’s Terms of Use grant the user an ownership interest in 
the content is meritless).
393 Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
394 Id. at 802–03.
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controversy on the question if, through the advertising service, Facebook 
required all house- and apartment-hunters to share racial, ethnic, or gender 
information about themselves or just enabled advertisers to exclude users 
based on that information.  In that scenario, after Roommates, Facebook 
would almost certainly be subject to liability under the FHA.  The social 
media company would likely be even more exposed to liability if it 
required its social media users to share race or ethnicity (or any 
information indicating membership in a protected class) even if those users 
never used the advertising service. 
Facebook, however, is not so brazen.  It does not require participants 
on the advertising platform or through the social media application to share 
prohibited information.  Nor does it publish all the information it receives; 
it publishes only a fraction of the user information that it collects, analyzes, 
and classifies.  Relying on algorithms for understanding “big data,” 
Facebook sorts users on a variety of salient dimensions—by, for example, 
hobby, communities of interest, and profession.  This is the same process 
that enables its flagship social media site to recommend new friends, curate 
news and current events, and post targeted advertisements for each user.  
Affinity designations are just one way of articulating the data that it 
collects and analyzes.  
Practically, it was inevitable that Facebook would enable advertisers to 
microtarget audiences.  After all, this is what effective advertisers and 
marketing directors do anyway in practically all markets. Facebook’s great 
advantage is that it sits atop an extraordinary trove of user data through 
which it can make marketing across substantive areas more efficient and
effective than ever.  A publisher of Urdu language books would not want 
to reach anyone other than Pakistanis or, better, people with an affinity for 
Pakistani culture.  A costume designer would be right to target women 
with an affinity for soca music during carnival season.  A nonprofit that is 
hosting a career fair for Latinos in New York City should probably target 
New Yorkers with an affinity for the Dominican Republic.  A merchant 
who sells hair care products for black women will reasonably target those
women at the exclusion of others.395 The advertising service is just one 
way of sorting pertinent user data to aid small businesses, product 
managers, and individual users in practical ways.  
But does Section 230 shield Facebook from liability for enabling users 
or advertisers to discriminate against protected classes in markets that are 
only tenuously tied to the social media service? Or, what is more, may 
Facebook claim the immunity when it analyzes and clusters the data in 
ways that users could not foresee or, perhaps, desire? There are several 
                                                                                                                         
395 See Christian Martinez, Driving Relevance and Inclusion with Multicultural Marketing,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 28, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/driving-relevance-and-
inclusion-with-multicultural-marketing/.
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reasons to believe that the company would be protected under the statute. 
First, it is not at all obvious that the ethnic or multicultural affinity 
classification is an actionable proxy for race or ethnicity, as it theoretically 
could include users of all racial and ethnic backgrounds.  Sorting users by 
affinity rather than race or ethnicity is not the same as sorting on ethnicity 
or race as such.  In any event, unlike the service at issue in Roommates,
Facebook’s advertising service does not require that users share prohibited 
information about themselves.  Nor does it require users to express 
preferences for races or ethnicities.  Its algorithms do the work of sorting. 
Facebook leaves it to advertisers to decide the uses to which they put the 
service and affinity classifications.  This use-agnosticism suggests that the 
service is a neutral tool for user-to-user interaction and commerce in the 
way envisioned under the prevailing doctrine. 
On the other hand, a fair housing or equal employment challenge to 
Facebook’s advertising service could cite Roommates (and Carafano) to 
argue that the ethnic or multicultural affinity designations make the 
violation of civil rights laws possible.  The company materially contributes 
to discriminatory online conduct because the Facebook-created affinity 
classifications are essential to actualizing illegal online conduct.396 The 
company’s design implicates it in all discriminatory advertising 
campaigns.  Under this theory, Facebook would be subject to what I have 
called above design liability, in contrast to publisher or distributor 
liability.397
That the company collects and synthesizes non-racial or non-ethnic 
user data to create “ethnic” or “multicultural affinity” classifications does 
not necessarily justify the immunity.  To the contrary, Facebook’s use of 
big data algorithmic analysis of ostensibly non-racial data is precisely the 
                                                                                                                         
396 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2008); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
397 See supra Section IV.A.  Framed in this way, we might think that prevailing norms in the law 
of product liability might have something to teach.  I do not offer here any meaningful comparison.  
One worthwhile consideration here is how or even whether the manufacturer of a defective product is 
legally implicated in an injury to a plaintiff by a third party’s illegal use of the defective product. 
Public law immunity for gun manufacturers comes to mind.  See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms 
International, FBTCV 156048103S, 2016 WL 8115354, at * 23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016) 
(applying immunity under Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901-7903).  This 
is in contrast to the affirmative duty of web developers to accommodate all users of their online service 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 
946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that access to public accommodation is 
limited to physical access).  Some courts have found online services to be outside of the scope of the 
ADA.  E.g., Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 Fed. Appx. 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Cal 2011); Oullette v. Viacom, No. CV 10–133–M–DWM–JCL, 
2011 WL 1882780, at *7 (M.D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011). Others have not.  E.g., Nat’l Fed. of the Blind 
v. Scribd., 162 F. Supp. 3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. 
Supp. 2d 196, 208 (D. Mass. 2012).
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sort of thing on which we would expect bigots to rely to mask their true 
intentions.  Facebook also collects user data through its flagship social 
media application that it, in turn, exploits in the ancillary advertising 
service.  The company’s contribution to the unlawful online discriminatory 
conduct is material—indeed, indispensable—because, through the power 
of its algorithmic processing, it creates commercially salient classifications 
that were indiscernible before the intervention. What is more, the purposes 
to which user content are put are arguably unrelated to the services to 
which users volunteer their information in the first instance.  To put this in 
the terms of the doctrine, it might be unreasonable for Facebook to expect 
users to provide personal information about themselves (including data that 
is not intuitively racial or ethnic) that could later be used to discriminate 
against them or others on the basis of race or proxies for race.398
B. Public Duties
There is at least one other consideration that counsels against 
immunizing Facebook for discriminatory advertising campaigns that 
violate the FHA.  As Roommates and Accusearch illustrate, plaintiffs who 
are not directly injured by a discrete volitional act by a third-party user 
may still overcome Section 230 to the extent that the defendant service 
creates or develops prohibited content by design.  This feature in the 
doctrine enables parties to stand in as a representative of the public.  Thus, 
Roommates could not claim the immunity because it elicited and published 
FHA-prohibited content.  Accusearch was not immune because it 
contracted with researchers to violate consumer privacy laws.  In both 
cases, the injury was not to a discrete party as much as to the public in 
general.  These were cases in which defendant services engaged in what 
Jack Balkin has called “algorithmic nuisance[s],” the “socially unjustified 
use of computational capacities that externalizes costs onto innocent 
others.”399 Thus, in both cases, plaintiffs—a civil rights organization and a 
federal agency—stood in on behalf of the public.
Generally, as I show at the end of Section II.D above, the immunity 
does not shield services from liability for violating a duty that they owe to 
their individual users.400 But services also are not entitled to protection 
                                                                                                                         
398 Compare Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving a user who provided 
his email without intending for the email to be publicly available), with Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 785, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (addressing a plaintiff who claimed Facebook “creates content by 
deceptively mistranslating members’ actions”). 
399 Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017).
400 See supra Part II (discussing Barnes v. Yahoo); see also Goddard v. Google, 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1193, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (immunity does not apply to “conduct giving rise to an independent and 
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from liability under Section 230 when they engage in conduct that is 
against manifest public law.  Thus, the courts in Roommates and 
Accusearch rejected the immunity for the defendant services in those cases 
because the defendants violated public law on housing discrimination and 
unfair trade practices.401
In some regards, the opinions in those cases just restated Section 230’s 
plain terms that services are not immune from liability for creating or 
developing illegal content “in whole or in part.”402 But the nature of the 
legal duties that gave rise to potential liability in those cases moved them 
out of the Zeran framework (i.e., injury to plaintiff arising from a discrete 
volitional act by a third-party user) because plaintiffs’ claims in those cases 
arose from the obligations the defendants owed by virtue of public law. 
The complaining parties in these cases were a civil rights organization and 
a government agency.403 Plaintiffs could have been any party that could 
stand in for the public.404 Thus, based on this idea, as unstated as it is, 
courts have rejected the Section 230 defense in a variety of very recent 
cases when the defendant provider engages in conduct that directly violates 
strict federal prohibitions.405
CONCLUSION
Immunity doctrine under Section 230 rests on an outdated view of how 
most online intermediaries do business.  Today, most providers do not 
solely relay messages or make connections, uninterested in what their users 
say or do.  The largest and most popular applications today collect, 
                                                                                                                         
401 See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the FTC
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exhaustively analyze, repackage, and then republish customer information. 
And they engineer users’ online experiences to elicit as much information 
as possible.  There is nothing passive or indifferent in any of this.  There is 
certainly nothing in this that resembles “publishing.”
This is not an indictment of the activity or business model that the 
largest and most popular intermediaries provide. But it does suggest that 
courts ought to rethink the scope of the immunity under Section 230 in a 
way that is adapted to the oversized influence that online applications and 
marketplaces have on users’ online conduct today.  It may be that it does 
not matter what we call them— publishers or designers of user content—if
they are soliciting and curating and editing illicit material. But courts, this 
Article proposes, should be far more attentive to the designs that determine 
online content than the prevailing doctrine has allowed to this point.  They 
should shield providers from liability for third-party online conduct only to 
the extent such providers truly operate as conduits or, as the statute 
provides, they voluntarily act in good faith as Good Samaritans in the 
interest of protecting the vulnerable among us.
